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DEATH FOR DRUG RELATED KILLINGS: REVIVAL OF THE
FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY*
SANDRA D. JORDAN**
I. INTRODUCTION
Capital punishment is the most severe punishment that society can
impose upon its citizens. Because of the finality of the punishment, it is a
highly divisive emotional topic that engenders strong and widely diver-
gent opinions from individuals at all levels of society. Views range from
those who believe death is appropriate for all felonies to those who abhor
capital punishment for any crime. The diverse views result from the
wide range of moral, religious and philosophical views that make up our
pluralistic society. The dialogue implicates difficult moral choices that
test our values as individuals and as a society.
Proponents of the death penalty have emphasized that it is a deter-
rent to future crime and it protects society from the one put to death
because that individual will never commit another crime. I Punishment is
further reinforced with respect to serial killers and others who have com-
mitted depraved crimes without the apparent capacity to conform to so-
ciety's standards of legal conduct. Proponents argue that the
punishment in such cases must fit the crime.2 Their aim is retribution-
society and individual victims must be satisfied that the murder has been
avenged.
Abolitionists argue that procedural safeguards do not ensure that
the innocent are not killed. 3 Further, the present system is often skewed
* Copyright © 1992, Sandra D. Jordan
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Assistant United
States Attorney, Western District of Pennsylvania, 1979-1988. The views expressed herein are solely
those of the author. I want to thank my colleagues and friends, Welsh White and Robert Harper,
who read earlier drafts of this Article and offered valuable observations, and Adam Kurland for his
constructive insight. My research assistant, Lauren MacVay, helped me with many of the last min-
ute research tasks and was a pleasure to work with.
1. Capital punishment is the "only effective way to protect society from certain violence-prone
and irreformable criminals" who can kill again. Burton Leiser, Retribution and the Limits of Capital
Punishment, in SOCIAL ETHICS: MORALITY AND SOCIAL POLICY 100 (Thomas A. Mappes & James
S. Zembaty eds., 3d ed. 1987).
2. Retentionists, those in favor of the death penalty, defend a punishment that has existed
since Biblical times as an effective deterrent. See, e.g., Matthew 5:38.
3. See Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987). The authors conducted an empirical study of 350 cases where
defendants convicted of capital crimes were later found to be innocent.
A recent example of this phenomenon was documented in the movie THE THIN BLUE LINE
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because of the different levels of competency of counsel, non-uniform
plea bargaining procedures, broad prosecutorial discretion and discrimi-
nation of all kinds.4  Moreover, some studies have shown that capital
punishment does not deter intentional homicides.5
Homicides resulting from drug usage are at an all time high. There
is almost universal agreement that the drug problem has infected our
society in an unprecedented fashion.6 With the escalating illegal drug
industry making the headlines daily, public concern for the rights of in-
nocent victims and law enforcement personnel has intensified. Surveys
reveal that the overwhelming majority of citizens, as much as 70% of the
American public, are in favor of the death penalty. 7 Reacting to this
public sentiment, Congress passed legislation providing for a death pen-
alty for drug kingpins8 who intentionally kill. The 1988 legislation au-
(Miramax 1988). The movie described the case of Randall Adams who was convicted for the mur-
der of a police officer in Texas in 1977. Although Adams was sentenced to death for this offense,
prior to his death the government discovered new evidence that showed that Adams was not the
killer. Had this discovery been delayed or not forthcoming, Adams could have easily been put to
death.
4. See generally WELSH S. WHITE, DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES (1991).
5. Studies have demonstrated that homicide rates do not vary greatly between states that have
a death penalty and those that do not. In addition, the homicide rates do not vary before and after
the imposition of capital legislation in any given jurisdiction. For a review of the literature on deter-
rence, see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERI-
CAN AGENDA 167-186 (1986).
6. Recent federal cases recognize the fact that the harm to society caused by the distribution of
illicit drugs far exceeds that involved in the case of the killing of an individual human being:
Except in rare cases, the murder's red hand falls on one victim only, however grim the
blow; but the foul hand of the drug dealer blights life after life and, like the vampire of
fable, creates others in its owner's evil image-others who create others still, across our
land and down our generations, sparing not even the unborn.
Terrebonne v. Butler, 820 F.2d 156, 157-158 (5th Cir. 1988).
7. See, e.g., American Survey: Capital Punishment, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 1988, at 23;
Fred Strasser, One Nation Under Siege, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 7, 1989, at 52 (survey taken in 1989 re-
vealed that 62% of Americans favor a death penalty for drug criminals); James S. Granelli, Justice
Delayed, 70 A.B.A. J. 51 (1984) (almost 73% of adults surveyed expressed support for capital
punishment).
8. WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1989, at A18. A "kingpin" is defined in Title 21 U.S.C. § 848(c):
a person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if -
(1) he violates any provision of [Title 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904] the punishment for which is a
felony, and (2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of [Title 21
U.S.C. §§ 801-904] or [Title 21 U.S.C. §§ 951-971] (A) which are undertaken by such per-
son in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom such person occupies
a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management, and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
21 U.S.C. § 848(c).
By contrast, the so-called "super kingpin" is an individual who is a principal administrator,
organizer, or leader of a continuing criminal enterprise and who is involved with 300 times the
quantity of drugs outlined in the statute, or whose enterprise receives $10 million in gross receipts
during any 12 month period. Id. § 848(b).
The word "series" in § 848(c)(2) has been construed to mean "three or more federal narcotics
law violations." United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1984).
The death penalty provision is contained in Title 21 U.S.C. § 848(e). See Part III infra.
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thorizes the death penalty for persons engaging in or working in
furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise ("CCE") who kill or who
cause intentional killings.9 Additionally, the law subjects to death those
who intentionally kill law enforcement personnel engaged in official du-
ties. This federal statute clearly demonstrates the public's voice being
heard by the elected members of our federal legislature.
This Article will discuss the recent landmark federal legislation en-
acted as an amendment to Title 21 United States Code, section 848, enti-
tled "Death Penalty in Case of Drug Related Killings."' 0 This
embarkment to revive the federal death penalty, in the name of combat-
ting the growing criminal drug activity, will undoubtedly serve as a
model for future legislation to impose death on "drug kingpins" due to
their drug activity, regardless of whether a death results."
The death penalty provision of section 848 was first used in Chicago
when the United States Attorney charged two individuals with narcotics
9. The law was part of the Omnibus Crime Bill of 1988. The Senate bill is entitled Death
Penalty in Case of Drug Related Killings and is numbered S. 2455. The House version, H.R. 4868 is
an amendment to the Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments of 1988 and is identical to S. 2455. 134 CONG.
REC. S6950 (daily ed. May 27, 1988).
10. Id. When Congress chose to resurrect the federal death sanction, it had surprisingly limited
dialogue and debate on the question. The amendment was passed partially as a reaction to the
public's desire to "do something" about our drug problem. This drug bill, which is a marked depar-
ture from prior federal criminal law, was first introduced in the Senate on May 27, 1988 and debated
on June 8, 9, and 10, September 8, and October 21, 1988. The law became effective on November 18,
1988.
In fact, this bill was the last piece of legislation to be passed by Congress prior to adjournment
at 2:55 a.m. on October 22, 1988. The time factor is reflected in comments by Rep. Lent who said
"[w]hile many in this Chamber are eager to adjourn and begin campaigning in the few weeks remain-
ing before Election Day, the fact that we are gathered here at the 11 th hour is testament to Congress'
determination to effectively address the Nation's insidious drug problem." 134 CONG. REC.
H 11245 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988); "Mr. President, I am concerned that it is 2:20 in the morning, and
I will not take long." Id. at S17303 (comments of Sen. Dole); "Mr. President, we are now passing
another drug bill, again in October before an election." Id. at S17305 (comments of Sen. Chiles).
11. Any such attempt to impose capital punishment without the requirement of a homicide
must recognize the limitation imposed by Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Current debate on
the expansion of the death penalty includes the restoration of an enforceable death penalty in Title
18 of the United States Code. This legislation creates a new death penalty authorization for a variety
of crimes including murders by federal prisoners who are serving a life sentence and fatal kidnap-
pings. 137 CONG. REC. S3216 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (description of offenses for which the death
penalty would be available). The Senate recently passed this legislation, S. 1241, on July 11, 1991.
See 137 CONG. REC. S9982 (daily ed. July 15, 1991).
The Senate also passed an omnibus crime bill to impose the death penalty on non-homicidal
drug kingpin activity. See Sandra R. Acosta, Comment, Imposing the Death Penalty Upon Drug
Kingpins, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 596 (1990). Supporters advance this legislation on the theory that
one who infects society by placing a quantity of drugs into the stream of commerce is as dangerous
as one who kills intentionally. Drug dealing activity creates a high probability that death and de-
struction will result. The bill essentially provides that those involved in the manufacture or distribu-
tion of a huge quantity of drugs will be subject to death if convicted. Id. at 598. "[U]nderstand what
you are doing because you are killing, and you are participating in the death of innocents throughout
the country-those who die on overdoses, and those who die because of the criminal activity of
others." 135 CONG. REC. S16,690 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
1991]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
violations and also notified them that, if convicted, the government
would seek the death penalty. This action represents the government's
first application of the amended section 848 to a person working in fur-
therance of a drug enterprise.' 2 The jury declined to impose the death
sentence on the defendant, a drug kingpin who had ordered the killing
that resulted. The co-defendant accused of actually performing the kill-
ing at the direction of the drug kingpin likewise was convicted but was
not sentenced to death. The first person was sentenced to death under
this statute on May 14, 1991 in Alabama. 13
The Article will briefly review relevant Supreme Court decisions
that relate to the amended federal law. Next, the Article examines the
status of the federal capital sentencing schemes and the particulars of the
statute followed by a review of the legislative history of the statute. The
Article will conclude with recommendations of ways that the law should
be amended to comport with the legislative purposes. The author sub-
mits that revisions are needed in order to bring the statute more in line
with its legislative purpose and to tailor the law to its intended goals.
It should be noted at the outset that this Article's review of the
current amendment to section 848 does not reflect either an agreement
with or an opposition to the death penalty. Rather, this analysis is of-
fered as a critique of the legislative attempt to deal with our nation's drug
problem through the enactment of capital legislation. The central focus
of the Article is whether the statute is consistent with its legislative pur-
pose, which is to impose the death penalty on drug kingpins and major
drug dealers and importers. If the law can be interpreted in ways incon-
sistent with the legislative goals, it should be amended to conform with
the drafters' agenda. Because of the extraordinary nature of the penalty,
whenever a state or the federal government seeks to kill criminals, it
must do so in a way that does not offend the Constitution, societal norms
or the proper functioning of the criminal justice system.
II. SUPREME COURT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Although scholars have argued that the procedures for imposing
death are innately unfair in a civilized society, death penalty opponents
have failed to stop the return of numerous death penalty statutes. The
12. The first defendant actually sentenced to death under amended section 848 was David Ron-
ald Chandler who was convicted in Birmingham, Alabama for violations of 21 U.S.C. § 848 and 18
U.S.C. § 2. Chandler was sentenced to death on May 14, 1991. No execution method or date has
been specified yet. Henry J. Reske, First Death Penalty Under New Law, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1991, at 24.
See discussion Part IV infra.
13. See supra note 12.
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Supreme Court's decisions in the last nineteen years have caused an over-
haul of the various state statutes and shaped our modem system of capi-
tal punishment by setting constitutional parameters for its imposition. In
the legal battleground producing the majority of death penalty jurispru-
dence, the Supreme Court has not only found that the death penalty is
constitutional, but has also accepted the death penalty as a legitimate
societal response to certain criminal activity. A brief review of relevant
Supreme Court capital punishment jurisprudence follows.
The modem era of capital punishment began in 1972 when the
Supreme Court struck down the death penalty statutes in several states in
the landmark case of Furman v. Georgia.'4  Today only 14 states are
without a death penalty statute, while the remaining 36 states have vari-
ous capital punishment provisions.' s In the years since Furman, states
with capital punishment laws have addressed the procedural and sub-
stantive issues critical to capital punishment legislation in whole or in
14. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Furman decision reads in its entirety as follows:
Petitioner in No. 69-5003 was convicted of murder in Georgia and was sentenced to
death pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969).
Petitioner in No. 69-5030 was convicted of rape in Georgia and was sentenced to death
pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969). Peti-
tioner in No. 69-5031 was convicted of rape in Texas and was sentenced to death pursuant
to Vernon's Tex. Penal Code, Art. 1189 (1961). Certiorari was granted limited to the
following question: "Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in [these
cases] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments?" The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty
in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments. The judgement in each case is therefore reversed insofar as it leaves
undisturbed the death sentence imposed, and the cases are remanded for further
proceedings.
So ordered.
Id. at 239-40 (citations omitted).
15. The thirty-six states that have a capital punishment law are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey;, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Capital Punishment
1989, DEP'T OF JUSTICE BULL., Oct. 1989, at 24; see also NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, DEATH
Row U.S.A. (Aug. 23, 1991).
Legislative discussion clearly shows that this federal statute was enacted to subject drug killers
to federal authority. These same individuals who kill are nevertheless subject to state prosecution for
the intentional murder. Double jeopardy is inapplicable where one sovereign "requires proof of a
fact that the other [sovereign] does not." Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). A
convicted federal defendant remains liable for prosecution under state law for the same killing since
the federal statute requires proof of the continuing criminal enterprise which is not required for local
prosecution.
Congress discussed the fact that this new legislation would invariably encroach on the states
that have no death penalty laws. Thus, since the crimes covered, intentional murders, are also pun-
ished under state law, this federal effort directly impacts those citizens of states that have no capital
laws. Because of the highly emotional debate that surrounds capital punishment, fourteen states
have elected not to allow their citizenry, for whatever reasons, to be subjected to death for even the
most violent criminal conduct.
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part. Since 1977, almost all capital punishment sentencing has been lim-
ited to crimes of murder.1 6 Any analysis of the current status of the
death penalty in this country begins with Furman and continues with the
other key case of Gregg v. Georgia,17 decided four years later in 1976.
Prior to Furman, juries both adjudicated guilt and determined sen-
tencing in one criminal proceeding. Because juries were left to decide
whether the defendants should die or live, without any guidance in mak-
ing the decision, the brief Furman per curiam decision invalidated the
capital sentencing procedures insofar as they allowed capricious applica-
tion of the death penalty. All existing death penalty laws were deemed
inoperative because they lacked adequate procedural provisions. No
clear majority of the Court spoke with unanimity on a theoretical basis
for the invalidation of the capital punishment statutes under
consideration.
The one-paragraph Furman decision produced a five-to-four split of
opinion without any consistent basis or rationale.' 8 In order to pass con-
stitutional muster, a death penalty statute must "channel the sentencer's
discretion by 'clear and objective standards' that provide 'specific and
detailed guidance' and that 'make rationally reviewable the process for
imposing a sentence of death.' "19 Since the sentencer must distinguish
between murderers and decide which defendants, if any, should be sen-
tenced to die for their crimes, the standards used cannot be vague.
Four years after Furman, the Court in Gregg adopted procedural
safeguards to ensure that the death penalty would be imposed in a just
16. This limitation was a direct reaction to the Supreme Court's holding in the case of Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), which held that capital punishment is an excessive penalty for the rape
of an adult woman where death did not occur as a result of the crime.
17. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
18. Taken together, the opinions encompass over 225 pages of text. Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, Douglas, Stewart, and White joined to strike down the three death penalty statutes under
consideration by the Court. Justice White found that the death penalty did not operate as a deter-
rent since it was applied so infrequently. Justice Stewart reasoned that the statutes under considera-
tion allowed death to be capriciously imposed because the juries were given full discretion to apply
the penalty. Justices Marshall and Brennan, writing separate opinions, took the position that capital
punishment was, per se, unconstitutional and a cruel and unusual punishment which violated the
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.
Justice Douglas stated, in a concurring opinion, that capital punishment is "unusual" if it dis-
criminates against any defendant because of race, religion, class or any other characteristic which
allows the application of prejudices. Furman, 408 U.S. at 242. Moreover, the punishment is both
"cruel and unusual" if it is applied unconstitutionally to minorities. Id. at 245. He concluded that if
juries or judges are left with no guidelines in imposing a sentence of death, then the decisions are
inherently unconstitutional because of the ability of the uncontrolled sentencer to capriciously im-
pose death. Id. at 255. Furman invalidated the then existing jury-discretionary system of capital
punishment.
19. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1980).
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and rational manner. Gregg v. Georgia 20 held that the determination of
guilt, whether by judge or by jury, should be made in the first stage of the
proceeding. After that, the sentencing court should conduct a post-ver-
dict, pre-sentence hearing where additional evidence is presented con-
cerning any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. At this time, the
sentencing authority should have at its disposal all relevant information
with which to make an informed decision. Thus, the bifurcated proceed-
ing both allows a jury to consider all relevant information for individual-
ized sentencing and reduces the possibility that a death penalty will be
applied arbitrarily.21
Several guiding principals reflect the Court's recent holdings. The
defendant must be given every opportunity to offer evidence in mitigation
of punishment. 22 The sentencer, whether judge or jury, must be guided
by established criteria in the exercise of sentencing discretion.23
Mandatory capital punishment is unconstitutional 24 and any capital pun-
ishment scheme must genuinely narrow the class of persons subject to
death. 25
Against this backdrop and the states' nineteen years of experience,
Congress established the 1988 federal death penalty statute with a goal of
combatting our country's drug problem by providing for death for drug
kingpins who kill. In cases of federal jurisdiction, the law imposes the
death penalty in states that have not enacted legislation to execute their
citizens, even for the most heinous crimes. Congress passed this law in
the waning hours of its last session in 1988. The legislation was enacted
without the benefit of the usual hearings and/or committee reports rele-
vant to this critical issue.
20. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
21. There is an inherent conflict between these twin goals of individualized consideration and
consistent application of objective standards. On the one hand, a defendant wants the jury to know
all relevant information about the crime, the history and any other mitigating factors. On the other
hand, the strive for consistent application of capital punishment presupposes that certain defendants
who act in certain ways will be treated similarly. See generally WHITE, supra note 4, at ch. 1, at 6-8
(1991).
22. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
23. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
24. While mandatory capital punishment is unconstitutional, recent signals from the Court sug-
gest that this may be subject to review and change.
25. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633
(1977). In addition, judicial and prosecutorial conduct will be closely scrutinized to insure reliability
and fairness in the capital sentencing determinations. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320
(1985).
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III. FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY FOR DRUG KINGPINS WHO KILL
Federal capital legislation is not new. There are numerous death
penalty statutes contained in Title 18, United States Code.26 Any federal
death penalty law that has not been amended since the Furman deci-
sion 27 suffers from the same inadequacy that invalidated the state provi-
sions in Furman: the jury is allowed unguided discretion to decide which
murders should be punished by death. 28 Thus, Title 18 United States
Code, section 1111,29 the general federal murder provision which has a
death penalty component, has been deemed by the United States Depart-
ment of Justice to be unenforceable since Furman.30
With the revision of the United States Attorney's Manual, 31 the De-
26. The federal criminal code contains the following sections of Title 18 that have a capital
punishment provision:
18 U.S.C. § 34 (1982) (aircraft or motor vehicle destruction); § 351 (assassination of high
ranking governmental personnel); § 794 (espionage); § 844(d)(f) (using explosives that re-
sult in a death); § 111 l(b) (general federal murder statute); § 1751 (assassination of Presi-
dent and the staff); § 1992 (train wrecking); § 2381 (treason).
27. After the decision in Furman, the kidnapping statute was amended to delete its death pen-
alty provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 1201. The Aircraft Piracy Statute, 49 U.S.C. § 1472, was amended to
provide the procedural safeguards discussed in Furman. Prior to this amendment, the statute simply
provided for a death penalty and nothing more.
28. Pending legislation before Congress intended to remedy the invalid death penalty statutes
contained in the federal criminal code has recently passed in the Senate. See supra note 11.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (b) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever is guilty of murder in the first
degree, shall suffer death unless the jury qualifies its verdict by adding thereto 'without capital pun-
ishment,' in which event he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life." The Senate recently passed
a bill that would amend the death penalty provisions of Title 18 U.S.C. § 111 I. See infra note 62.
30. Section 9 of the United States Attorney's Manual stated the official position of the Depart-
ment of Justice that the existing death penalty laws were unenforceable:
9-10.010 Federal Death Penalty Provisions
With the exception of the Aircraft Piracy statute, the various existing federal death
penalty provisions are unenforceable in view of a series of Supreme Court decisions includ-
ing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) and United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968). These death penalty provisions are void because they set forth no legislated guide-
lines to control the fact-finder's discretion in determining whether the penalty of death is to
be imposed.
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, § 9-10 (1984).
31. In the recently revamped UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, section 9-10.010 (1988),
it states that:
there are some death penalty provisions which are so broad that no reasonable argument
could be made that they would survive an Eighth Amendment challenge. For example...
the general federal murder provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1111, [is unconstitutional because it]
gives the jury unguided discretion as to which murders will be punished by the death
penalty.
Despite the previous policy that foreclosed the imposition of the death penalty for federal
crimes, the Department of Justice recently altered its position on the question of the validity of the
death penalty. On October 1, 1988, prior to the amendment of section 848, the Department of
Justice completely reissued its United States Attorney's Manual including the provisions concerning
the federal death penalty. The Department now states:
The Office of Legal Counsel has reviewed other federal capital punishment provisions
and has concluded that the death penalty may be permissible for certain crimes in addition
to aircraft hijacking. There are arguments, never considered by the Supreme Court, that
[Vol. 67:79
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partment of Justice takes the official position that capital provisions are
possibly viable for certain crimes. The policy permits the imposition of
the death penalty by reading aggravating factors into the law because the
overall federal criminal statutory scheme provides for death only for cer-
tain offenses against the United States. Thus, the government's position
is that the capital provisions are in accordance with the Court's Jurek v.
Texas decision, which limited death to certain offenses. 32 In Jurek, the
Court upheld Texas' capital sentencing scheme because it limited death
to only five types of intentional and knowing homicides. This narrowing
required the sentencer to focus on the particularized nature of the crime
and find aggravating factors before death could be imposed. 33
Notwithstanding the position of the Department of Justice, with the
passage of the law entitled "Death Penalty in Case of Drug Related Kill-
ings," Congress has focused on drug "kingpins" 34 who intentionally kill.
imposition of the death penalty for narrowly drawn offenses against the United States and
its officials remain viable under the rationale of Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-10.010 (1988). This provision was included prior to the
amendment of section 848 on October 22, 1988.
32. 428 U.S. 262 (1976). By implication, although the statutory provisions have not been al-
tered, the current Department of Justice policy rationalizes that the death penalty is constitutional
for a limited group of crimes because they have never been tested in the Supreme Court after the
Furman decision. The United States Attorney's Manual judiciously states, "[t]hus under Jurek cer-
tain narrow federal statutes that carry a death penalty sanction, such as assassination of the Presi-
dent might survive an Eighth Amendment challenge." UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL,
supra note 31, § 9-10.010 at 1. The government has not yet presented this theory to the Supreme
Court.
Some commentators submit that all of the current federal death penalty statutes are constitu-
tional without the need for additional legislation. Paul D. Kamenar, Death Penalty Legislation for
Espionage and Other Federal Crimes is Unnecessary: It Just Needs a Little Re-Enforcement, 24
WAKE FOREsT L. REV. 881 (1989). Kamenar submits that neither Gregg nor Furman foreclose the
imposition of the death penalty for federal capital crimes. Id. at 891. "Any constitutional deficien-
cies with the death penalty can be easily cured by judicially imposed sentencing guidelines that
comport with the eighth and fifth amendments. Legislatively mandated guidelines are not constitu-
tionally necessary." Id. at 891-92 (emphasis in original).
33. Compare United States v. Harper, 729 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1984), where the defendant was
charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 794, espionage, for delivering secure national defense infor-
mation to a foreign officer with the intent to injure the United States. The statute called for any
penalty, up to and including the death penalty. The parties agreed that the death penalty provision
was unconstitutional since the sentencing procedures had not been amended after the decision in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
The district court ruled that a sentence of death was permissible because the court could formu-
late adequate sentencing guidelines and exercise discretion to "minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action," citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 159 (1976). The defendant was sen-
tenced to death.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed holding that the guidelines required by Gregg must be
legislatively and not judicially imposed. To hold otherwise, the court reasoned that the sentencing
authority would establish the very guidelines that are intended to limit the sentencing authority
itself. Gregg requires no less than external limitations, established by the legislature and set forth in
the statute.
34. Kingpins are defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848(c), supra note 8.
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The statute allows for the imposition of the death penalty under the fol-
lowing circumstances:
Death Penalty
(e)(1) In addition to the other penalties set forth in this section
(A) any person engaging in or working in furtherance of a
continuing criminal enterprise, or any person engaging in
an offense punishable under section 841(b)(1)(A)3 5 or sec-
tion 960(b)(1) 36 who intentionally kills or counsels, com-
mands, induces, procures or causes the intentional killing
of an individual and such killing results, shall be sen-
tenced to any term of imprisonment, or may be sentenced
to death; and
(B) any person, during the commission of, in furtherance
of, or while attempting to avoid apprehension, prosecu-
tion or service of a prison sentence for, a felony violation
of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter who
intentionally kills or counsels, commands, induces, pro-
cures, or causes the intentional killing of any Federal,
State, or local law enforcement officer engaged in, or on
account of, the performance of such officer's official duties
and such killing results, shall be sentenced to any term of
imprisonment, which shall not be less then 20 years, and
which may be up to life imprisonment, or may be sen-
tenced to death.37
Under section A, a defendant may be susceptible to the death pen-
alty under three distinct prongs. Under section (e)(1)(A), a defendant
who commits the substantive violation of engaging in a continuing crimi-
nal enterprise 38 and intentionally kills or commands the killing of an in-
dividual may be sentenced to death if the targeted individual dies.
In the second instance, a defendant who engages in an offense pun-
ishable under 841(b)(1)(A) or 960 (b)(1) by transacting in massive quan-
35. Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A) provides the penalties outlined in section 841(a) for those
who:
(1) [ ] manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, dis-
tribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or
(2) [ ] create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a
counterfeit substance.
Section 841(b)(l)(A) provides enhanced penalties for those dealing in large quantities of drugs
and authorizes imprisonment for up to life. If death or serious injury results from the drug dealing
activity, the minimum sentence is 20 years.
36. Title 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1) details the penalties for those convicted of importing and ex-
porting a controlled substance and provides enhanced penalties of not less than 10 years and up to
life, or not less than 20 years if there is death or serious bodily injury resulting from the use of the
substance.
37. Id. at § 848(e).
38. This is the kingpin. A continuing criminal enterprise is defined in § 848(c). See supra note
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tities of drugs39 and, while engaging in a drug transaction, intentionally
kills or commands the killing of an individual who may be killed, is sub-
ject to the death penalty upon conviction.
Finally, where the defendant acts "in furtherance of a continuing
criminal enterprise" and intentionally kills or commands the killing of an
individual who subsequently is killed, death is allowed as a penalty. Ac-
cording to the language of the statute, the defendant need not himself
"engage in a continuing criminal enterprise." 4°
In section 848(e)(1)(B), the statute provides for a sentence of up to
20 years or the death penalty if the defendant kills a law enforcement
officer engaged in official duties. This killing can occur "during the com-
mission of, in furtherance of, or while attempting to avoid apprehension,
prosecution or service of a prison sentence for a felony violation of [any
Title 21 drug offense]."141 The killing need not be committed at the hands
of the defendant, but can actually be performed on the defendant's com-
mand, as is the case where the defendant "counsels, commands, induces,
procures, or causes the intentional killing."' 42 Under this section, there is
no requirement that the killing be committed by a kingpin or by workers
in a kingpin's enterprise. The killing must simply be drug-related.
If the government intends to seek the death penalty against an in-
dicted defendant, it must seek prior approval from the Department of
Justice43 and notify the defendant of this intention within a reasonable
time prior to trial.44
Procedurally, the finding of guilt must be separate and distinct from
the consideration of whether death is the appropriate penalty. 45 A de-
fendant can choose to be sentenced by a court or a jury, but if the defend-
ant elects to be sentenced by the court, the government must approve the
39. These are major drug dealers or importers but are not, by definition, kingpins.
40. The section reads, "any person engaging in or working in furtherance of a continuing crimi-
nal enterprise .... Id. at § 848(e)(1) (emphasis added).
Many prosecutors refer to the person "engaged" in the continuing criminal enterprise as the
"kingpin," and those persons "working in furtherance" of the continuing criminal enterprise as the
"employees" of the kingpin-by definition, the employees are the five or more individuals over
whom the kingpin "occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of
management." Id. at § 848(c)(2)(A).
41. 21 U.S.C. § 844 makes it a misdemeanor to knowingly possess a controlled substance. A
second possessory offense for a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) is a felony. Section 841(a)(1), also a
felony, prohibits possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute.
42. One who "intentionally kills or counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the inten-
tional killing of an individual [is subject to the death penalty.]" Id. at § 848(e)(I)(B) (emphasis
added).
43. "The death penalty shall not be recommended without the approval of the Attorney Gen-
eral." UNITED STATES ATrORNEY'S MANUAL, supra note 31, § 2.151. See generally id. § 9-10.020.
44. 21 U.S.C. § 848(h).
45. Id. at §§ 848(g), (i).
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defendant's waiver of jury sentencing.4
The sentencing hearing is conducted in two stages. First, the gov-
ernment must prove that the defendant is "death qualified" by proving
the existence of at least one of the statutorily articulated aggravating fac-
tors.47 The jury must be unanimous on the existence of any aggravating
factor.48  In the second phase of the penalty hearing, the sentencer must
determine whether the defendant is to be put to death for the crime.
During this stage, the defendant is allowed to present mitigating factors
in an attempt to convince the sentencer that his life should be spared.49
These mitigating factors must be shown by a preponderance of the evi-
dence and need not be found to exist by a unanimous jury.50 The jury
must determine only whether "the aggravating factors found to exist suf-
ficiently outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist, or in
the absence of mitigating factors, whether the aggravating factors are
46. Id. at § 848(i)(2)(C).
47. Id. at § 848(k), Return of Findings, reads:
[The jury] shall return special findings identifying any aggravating factors set forth in sub-
section (n) of this section found to exist. If one of the aggravating factors set forth in
subsection (n)(l) of this section and another of the aggravating factors set forth in
paragraphs (2) through (12) of subsection (n) of this section is found to exist, a special
finding identifying any other aggravating factor for which notice has been provided [.. •]
may be returned.
Id.
48. Id. at § 848(k): "A finding with respect to any aggravating factor must be unanimous." Id.
49. Id. at § 848(m). The following ten mitigating factors can be considered by the fact finder:
(1) The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct or
to conform conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, regardless of
whether the capacity was so impaired as to constitute a defense to the charge.
(2) The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress, regardless of whether the
duress was of such a degree as to constitute a defense to the charges.
(3) The defendant is punishable as a principal (as defined by section 2 of Title 18) in the
offense, which was committed by another, but the defendant's participation was relatively
minor, regardless of whether the participation was so minor as to constitute a defense to
the charge.
(4) The defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that the defendant's conduct in the
course of the commission of murder, or other offense resulting in death for which the
defendant was convicted, would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to
any person.
(5) The defendant was youthful, although not under the age of 18.
(6) The defendant did not have a significant prior criminal record.
(7) The defendant committed the offense under severe mental or emotional disturbance.
(8) Another defendant or defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be punished by
death.
(9) The victim consented to the criminal conduct that resulted in the victim's death.
(10) That other factors in the defendant's background or character mitigate against imposi-
tion of the death sentence.
Id.
50. Id. at § 848(k) states:
A finding with respect to a mitigating factor may be made by one or more of the
members of the jury, and any member of the jury who finds the existence of a mitigating
factor may consider such a factor established for purposes of this subsection, regardless of
the number of jurors who concur that the factor has been established. Id.
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themselves sufficient to justify a sentence of death."'A sentence of death
may be imposed only by a unanimous verdict. Regardless of the findings
to support the death sentence, no jury is required to impose death.52
However, once the jury makes the recommendation that death is an ap-
propriate sentence, this finding is binding upon the court.5 3
Any defendant sentenced to death has the right to appellate review
of both the conviction and sentence.54 The appellate court must review
the conviction to ensure that:
(A) the sentence of death was not imposed under the influence of pas-
sion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and
(B) the information supports the special finding of the existence of
every aggravating factor upon which the sentence was based, together
with, or the failure to find, any mitigating factors as set forth or al-
lowed in this section. 55
Failing to address the importance of uniformity in federal criminal
law, this statute has no specific provision for the manner of execution
except that it must be carried out according to state law.56 Needless to
say, states that have no capital punishment laws have no provision for
execution. Thus, the sentencing judge selects a site and manner for the
execution.5 7
With this overview in mind, the starting point for the interpretation
of this statute is the language of the law itself.58 One need look no fur-
51. Id.
52. Id. "The jury or the court, regardless of its findings with respect to aggravating and miti-
gating factors, is never required to impose a death sentence and the jury shall be so instructed." Id.
53. Id. at § 848(1). "Upon the recommendation that the sentence of death be imposed, the
court shall sentence the defendant to death." Id. Thus, a court is precluded from setting aside the
jury's recommendation and imposing a life sentence instead.
54. Id. at § 848(q)(3).
55. Id.
56. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3566 provides that:
[t]he manner of inflicting the punishment of death shall be that prescribed by the laws of
the place within which the sentence is imposed .... If the laws of the place within which
sentence is imposed make no provision for the infliction of the penalty of death, then the
court shall designate some other place in which such sentence shall be executed in the
manner prescribed by the laws thereof. Id.
57. This "pick a state" concept offends death penalty scholars who suggest that at a minimum
Congress should provide for a consistent manner of death for a violation of this federal law. The
American Civil Liberties Union commented on a draft of the bill in a letter to Senators Levin and
Evans dated June 7, 1988 and in an identical letter to Representatives Conyers and Rodino, dated
June 24, 1988. The letters were authored by Arvid E. Roach II of Covington & Burling in Washing-
ton D.C. Although taking no position on the advisability of the death penalty itself, the author
concluded that the law suffered from numerous contradictions and omissions.
This letter is reprinted in the Congressional Record at 134 CONG. REC. S7567-7572 (daily ed.
June 10, 1988) [hereinafter Roach Comment].
58. "In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the statutory lan-
guage is unambiguous, in the absence of a 'clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that
language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.'" United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576
(1981) (citations omitted).
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ther if the legislative intent can be gleaned from a thorough reading of
the statutory language. It is questionable whether the law's provisions
truly fulfill its legislative purpose. Five issues are of particular concern:
use of the category "working in furtherance of" the CCE; focus on status
and the use of aggravating factors at the sentencing phase; competency of
counsel; overbreadth of the statute in reaching law enforcement-related
deaths; and limited appellate review.
Both the legislative history and the law entitled "Death Penalty in
Case of Drug Related Killings" demonstrate clearly that this amendment
was designed to reach murders committed by drug "kingpins." 59 How-
ever, reading the language used in the statute reveals that the law paints
with a broad brush and reaches killings that have no relationship to drug
"kingpins" or even to drugs. Moreover, certain ambiguous language is
subject to conflicting interpretations. Because of the speed in which this
law was passed, it was not perfected through committee review. Further-
more, no committee reports were issued or debated.6° Some legal ana-
lysts who have studied this law suggest that it not be used as a model for
future federal capital legislation.6' The manner in which this law was
passed is significant. Because it is the first federal revival of capital pun-
ishment in decades, this statute will form the basis for additional at-
tempts to enact federal death penalty legislation for other criminal
59. The legislative history clearly indicates that the law was designed to reach those "kingpins"
who cause untold destruction because of killings related to drug dealing. "Through the death pen-
alty provision we have sent a signal to drug kingpins that we will no longer tolerate the drug related
killings .... 134 CONG. REC. S16036 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988); "The death penalty will be available
as punishment for a drug kingpin who commits or orders a drug-related murder .. " Id. at S16070;
the law reaches "the drug kingpin who orders the assassination of someone or those who have such a
reckless disregard for human life [that they] would come into an area and open fire and kill.
134 CONG. REC. S14752 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1988).
60. Near the end of a session on June 9, 1988 Sen. Adams observed, "I regret the fact that these
issues have been joined in this way. I would have preferred that this bill come before us only after
hearings had been conducted and a record established." 134 CONG. REC. S7500 (daily ed. June 9,
1988).
One indication of the rush to enact the law is found in Senator D'Amato's remark when asked
why a certain aggravating factor was included. D'Amato, the sponsor of the bill, responded: "[w]ell,
I just thought of it on the spur of the moment. I thought it was pretty good." 134 CONG. REC.
S7491 (daily ed. June 9, 1988). D'Amato's blatant admission demonstrates some legislators' cavalier
attitude toward this critically important subject. The rushed debate without the usual intense con-
gressional study was perhaps a political reaction by Congress to pacify a frustrated constituency fed
up with the escalating, drug-related violence. As is evident from a study of the brief legislative
history, the hasty passage indicates a lack of probing debate and results in a law that may contain
some contradictions and inconsistencies.
61. Federal Death Penalty Legislation, 45 Rec. A.B. City N.Y. 617 (June 1990) [hereinafter
N.Y. Bar Report]. The Committee on Criminal Law of the Bar Association of New York City
studied this legislation and concluded that it suffered from "numerous inconsistencies and defects,
some of which we believe to be of constitutional dimensions. Because of the hasty manner in which
this legislation was, ... 'railroaded' through Congress, the glaring defects in this extremely impor-
tant statute never received adequate Congressional attention." Id. at 634.
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conduct. 62 The states may look to this law for guidance as a model stat-
ute when debating capital punishment legislation.
A. Death Penalty Reaches Enterprise Workers
Kingpins and large-scale drug dealers or importers who intention-
ally kill or command a killing are susceptible to the death penalty upon
conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 848.63 The two relevant prongs of section
848(e)(1)(A) do not depart from established criminal law concepts of ac-
complice liability.64 Individuals who are not themselves drug kingpins or
large-scale drug dealers or importers, but who nevertheless work "in fur-
62. On July 11, 1991 the Senate passed the Violent Crime Control Act of 1991. See 137 CONG.
REC. S9982 (daily ed. July 15, 1991). This legislation authorizes the death penalty for thirty federal
offenses. It amends Title 18 to restore an enforceable death penalty for the offenses that have not
been amended since the decision in Furman v. Georgia. The legislation specifies new procedures for
imposing and carrying out death sentences. In addition, the legislation creates new death penalty
authorization for any murder involving a firearm that has moved in interstate commerce, for civil
rights murders and for certain murders committed by federal prisoners. Moreover, it authorizes the
death penalty for drug related murders committed in the District of Columbia and for other murder-
ous drug offenses. The legislation authorizes the death penalty for the murder of federal and state
law enforcement officials. Id.
63. Congress was concerned that drug kingpins who kill not escape a death sentence under
federal law. Clearly, the thrust of the legislation was to reach drug-related killings including not
only those performed by the kingpin, but also those committed by other individuals involved in the
drug business.
Congressman Traficant remarked that "this bill contains the Federal death penalty for those
drug killers who commit murder." 134 CONG. REC. H10710 (daily ed. October 21, 1988); section
848 was enacted for "drug kingpins who are indiscriminately spreading death and violence, [this law
will] let them know the ultimate sanction will be used against them." Id. at S17303 (remarks of
Senate Majority Leader Dole); "Mr. President, that is not some small fish [describing the true king-
pin as the target of the legislation]. 134 CONG. REC. S7544 (daily ed. June 9, 1988).
The theme is reflected in these remarks: "The death penalty will be available as punishment for
a drug kingpin who commits or orders a drug-related murder .... 134 CONG. REC. S16070 (daily
ed. October 14, 1988); "Through the death penalty provision we have sent a signal to drug kingpins
that we will no longer tolerate the drug related killings .. " Id. at S16036; the law reaches the
"drug kingpin who orders the assassination of someone or those who have such a reckless disregard
for human life [that they] would come into an area and open fire and kill .... 134 CONG. REC.
S14752 (daily ed. October 6, 1988); "It would only apply to drug kingpins and those who have
profited substantially from selling drugs." 134 CONG. REC. S7585 (daily ed. June 10, 1988); the law
targets "the middle level management or the kingpins ... [not the] [t]rafficker, who is ... the one
that local police apprehend, [and] is usually a juvenile or some addict...." 134 CONG. REC. S15968
(daily ed. October 14, 1988).
64. Accomplice liability includes aiding, abetting, assisting, encouraging, soliciting, advising,
and procuring the commission of the offense. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAw 410, 436-44 (1987); PETER W. LOw, CRIMINAL LAW 236-42 (rev. ed. 1990). One can also be
an accomplice by agreeing to aid or attempting to aid. Id. Common law accomplice liability is
based on intentional conduct, not reckless or negligent conduct.
The Model Penal Code states that a person is guilty of a crime if he commits it "by his own
conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.06(1) (1962). One can be accountable for another's actions if one causes the other
to act, if one is an accomplice, or solicits, aids or agrees or attempts to aid. Id. § 2.06(3).
A person solicits another to commit a crime if he or she "commands, encourages or requests"
another person to commit the crime or to attempt to commit the crime or to become an accomplice
in the commission or attempted commission of a crime. Id. at § 5.02.
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therance of" a drug enterprise are subject to death under this law if they
commit an intentional killing. Prior to the passage of section 848(e), sec-
tion 848 applied only to kingpins. Those working for the enterprise were
prosecuted under other sections of Title 21 for their drug-related activi-
ties. What this amendment does, then, is bring within its scope the enter-
prise workers who kill and who would not otherwise be prosecuted under
section 848.65
"Working in furtherance of" is not defined anywhere within the
statutory scheme. 66 A literal reading of the language of the amendment
suggests that if an individual is not a kingpin or a drug dealer, but is only
tangentially connected with a CCE, he is nonetheless subject to the death
penalty if he kills another and the killing is pursuant to the drug enter-
prise. Moreover, if the defendant commands the killing but does not
himself actually perform the killing, and he engages in any of the other
outlined criminal activities, his conduct may subject him to capital pun-
ishment for the association with the CCE. Thus these two statutory con-
structions may have different effects on a variety of conceivable fact
patterns.
Consider a kingpin who orders a drug addict to murder a drug
buyer. Unknown to the kingpin, the addict has a side deal with the buyer
to also sell him stolen automobile parts. The buyer and addict meet to
consummate both the sale of the drugs and the stolen parts. Prior to the
completion of the sale, the addict discovers that the buyer is an inform-
ant and has been cooperating with the authorities. For this reason, the
addict kills the buyer.
This murder has a dual purpose. Prior to the amendment of section
848, the killing would be related to stolen merchandise and would subject
the addict/murderer to various local penalties, ranging from several
years incarceration to life imprisonment or to the death penalty, depend-
ing on the jurisdiction. Under section 848, since the killing was also in
65. The law reaches those who work in furtherance of the drug enterprise and thus advance
various illegal activities including drug-related murders. However, if the congressional goal with
this legislation is to reach those significant drug dealers who "[reap] the profits while others pay the
price in blood [and those who] have been able to stand off from afar and pull the strings," the law
reaches much further than necessary. 134 CONG. REC. H11267 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988).
66. While the statute and the legislative history indicate that capital punishment applies to a
limited group of killers who presumably are not themselves kingpins, the intentional killing must
nevertheless take place during the course of a drug transaction. Although the statute does not make
this clear, legislative history demonstrates that a killing "in furtherance of a continuing criminal
enterprise" requires that the "jury would have to determine that there is a direct connection between
the intentional killing and [the defendant's drug related activity]." 134 CONG. REC. H7275 (daily
ed. Sept. 8, 1988) (remarks of Rep. Gekas, the principal sponsor of the House bill) (emphasis added).
There is a critical distinction between killing in furtherance of a CCE and working in furtherance of
a CCE.
[Vol. 67:79
REVIVAL OF THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY
furtherance of the drug related CCE, both the murderer and the kingpin
are subject to the death penalty. "Working in furtherance of" does not
mean working "exclusively" for the CCE.67
Consider further several other scenarios: first, an employee in the
CCE, a so-called "gofer" who runs errands, is employed to deliver a
quantity of cocaine to a buyer. The gofer is armed. During the delivery
an altercation occurs over the payment for the drugs and the gofer kills
the buyer. Although the gofer was "working" in furtherance of the CCE
at the time of the killing, it is less clear that the killing was "in further-
ance of the CCE." One of the essential issues raised by this Article is
whether section 848 requires the killing itself to be in furtherance of the
CCE and whether the killing advances or supports some purpose of the
CCE.68
Arguably, the killing in the above scenario does not advance any
purpose of the CCE because murder brings attention to the CCE, and
causes the police to investigate earlier than they otherwise might. On the
other hand, the killing can serve as a lesson to others within the CCE
that the kingpin will not tolerate any disobedience or disagreements:
death will come to those who cross the kingpin. Viewed from this per-
spective, the killing is in furtherance of the CCE.69
67. Cases interpreting the phrase "in furtherance of" are plentiful in the law of conspiracy.
Compare United States v. Renfro, 620 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1980) (agents for a narcotics buyer who
consummate a transaction different from the co-defendant seller's are members of a single conspiracy
even though the acts further a joint purpose); United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1976)
(because defendant had dual purpose and was on his own "frolic," hearsay statement was inadmissi-
ble against co-conspirator); United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944 (7th Cir. 1989) (statement made to
promote prostitution was not made in furtherance of the charged conspiracy); United States v. Field-
ing, 645 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1981) (statements made by a co-conspirator relating to forming a new
conspiracy were not made in furtherance of the charged conspiracy and therefore not admissible
under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E)).
68. For example, a bank president can work in furtherance of a CCE by laundering the profits
of the drug operation and routing the money to an off-shore banking network. (Money laundering is
a Title 18 offense. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957.) If the kingpin decides to kill the bank president be-
cause he was skimming CCE profits and hires a hitman to accomplish this and the hit is successful,
the killing is arguably in furtherance of the CCE. If, however, the bank president learns of the plan
to kill him while he is transacting business related to the CCE, and is able to protect himself by
killing the hitman first, is this killing also in furtherance of the CCE? Clearly the bank president was
working in furtherance of the CCE at the time of either killing.
Arguably, this self-defensive action was not in furtherance of the CCE because it was not in-
tended to promote any CCE business. The primary motivation was self-defense. On the other hand,
the bank president might also want to protect the money belonging to the CCE. If one killing is in
furtherance of the criminal venture, why not the other? The fact that both actors are engaged in
criminal conduct is not determinative because Congress clearly intended that killings of rival drug
actors come within the scope of the law. See Part V, section B, infra. Whenever a killing takes place
between two armed individuals, it is fair to assume that each is primarily seeking personal protec-
tion. These drug rival killings are self-defensive in the same way as the bank president's was self-
defensive. At the time of the killing, however, each actor is "working in furtherance of a CCE."
69. The legislators did not define the relationship between the drug activity and the killing.
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Consider if the gofer, instead, consummates the deal with the buyer.
Upon leaving the scene to return the money to the kingpin, the gofer
intentionally kills a bystander who gets in the way. A cogent argument
can be made that this killing occurred while working in furtherance of
the CCE since the return of the financial proceeds of the transaction had
not yet been accomplished. But the killing itself was not in furtherance
of the CCE since it did not promote any activity of the CCE. Competent
defense counsel will argue that this totally accidental encounter with an
innocent bystander does not bring this death within section 848.
What these examples illustrate is that working in furtherance of a
CCE is not synonymous with killing in furtherance of a CCE. By choos-
ing a term with a very broad meaning, Congress has allowed for conflict-
ing interpretations and paved the way for the imposition of the death
sentence for conduct that has, arguably, only a remote relationship to the
CCE and drug dealing activity. The breadth of the statutory language
will allow prosecutors tremendous latitude in bringing a variety of con-
duct within section 848.
Thus, the killer can be subject to the death penalty for simply serv-
ing as an operative within the criminal enterprise. An individual who
acts as a lookout for the drug operation arguably may subject himself to
the death penalty if, while he is "working in furtherance of" the drug
operation, he kills an individual, not part of the enterprise, during a dis-
pute over the sale of "hot" merchandise unrelated to drugs. 70 This ex-
ample reaches the outer limits of the broad interpretation of the statute.
Several emphasized, however, that the killing had to be immediately and temporally related to an
on-going drug transaction. (See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S17301 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988). Sen. Byrd
commented that death penalty would be available for drug-related killing; Rep. Lent noted that the
death penalty would now be available for killing during the course of a drug-related felony. Id. at
H11245.
When President Reagan signed the bill into law on November 18, 1988, he noted that the
amendment "provid[ed] [a] death penalty for narcotics kingpins and drug related murderers." 24
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1522 (Nov. 18, 1988).)
When discussing this critical connection, Rep. Gekas explained that a person who killed while
in possession of marijuana would be subject to the death penalty only if he or she killed in order to
protect the drugs or avoid apprehension. 134 CONG. REC. H7275 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1988).
70. One need only be working in furtherance when the killing occurs. The statute does not say
"killing in furtherance." Because the statutory language does not specify that the killing must be
drug related, any activities committed "in furtherance" of drug dealing would be covered. It is likely
that courts will interpret this language in conformity with the prior cases in the area of conspiracy
law. Courts have defined what is remote and what is directly connected to a conspiracy in order to
define the membership of the conspiracy.
For example, in a prosecution for murder, a witness testified that the defendant was "fixing to
kill a Mexican." The court found the statement was nothing more than a casual admission to some-
one that the defendant decided to trust and the statement did not indicate the defendant intended to
further the conspiracy by announcing its object. United States v. Castillo, 615 F.2d 878 (9th Cir.
1980).
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If this killing furthers the CCE by avoiding detection, however, although
the killing itself was not directly related to drugs, it arguably falls more
squarely within the perceived intent of the law. In addition, the killing
can be committed by gross reckless conduct because the statute calls for
death even if the defendant "intentionally engaged in conduct which the
defendant knew would create a grave risk of death to a person. '71
It remains unclear under the Constitution how active a role an indi-
vidual must play in a killing before being subject to the death penalty. 72
Section 848 fails to articulate precisely just how an individual who does
not perform a killing will be subject to the death penalty. The law also
fails to specify how involved the killer should be with the drug enterprise
to qualify as "working in furtherance of" the CCE.
It is expected that courts will turn to an analogous test in conspiracy
law, requiring the government to prove that each overt act of a conspir-
71. 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(l)(D). The statute aggravates a defendant's conduct if he intentionally
engaged in conduct that he "knew would create a grave risk of death." Id. The Model Penal Code
defines intentional killing as murder when:
(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or
(b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life. Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor is en-
gaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit, robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force
or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1962).
The Supreme Court has held that the death penalty is a permissible sanction for killings where
the defendant substantially participated in a felony and was recklessly indifferent to the value of
human life and a death resulted. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
72. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). Tison raised the question whether the death
penalty was permitted where the defendant demonstrated major participation but whose mental state
was one of reckless indifference to the value of human life. The defendant supplied weapons, assisted
in the father's and another's prison escape, assisted in stopping the victims' vehicle, participated in
the robbery and kidnapping of the victims, watched without protest while the father and inmate
killed the four victims with a shotgun and assisted in flight and a shootout with police. This conduct
satisfied the culpability requirement because the defendants evidenced "major participation in the
felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life ...." Id. at 158.
One who does not participate in the physical act of killing but only aids, abets or counsels
another accomplice who performs the murder can be held liable based on vicarious liability under
the felony murder rule. Compare Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (death penalty imposed
on an accomplice who neither took life, intended to take life or attempted to do so violates the
constitution); see John H. Wickert, Eighth Amendment-The Death Penalty and Vicarious Felony
Murder: Nontriggerman May Not Be Executed Absent a Finding of an Intent to Kill, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1553 (1982).
Many commentators have criticized the felony murder rule as a basis of liability and punish-
ment for intentional killings. Because liability is based on the legal fiction of transferred intent, the
mens rea of the accomplice is never considered. The American Law Institute has proposed to abol-
ish the felony murder rule and require that homicides committed during a felony be prosecuted
under intent to kill theories. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1962). This has had little impact on
states that have, for the most part, retained the felony murder rule in some form. See also WAYNE
R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScOTt, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 560-61 (1972); Andrew H.
Freidman, Note, Tison v. Arizona: The Death Penalty and the Non-Triggerman: The Scales of Justice
are Broken, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 123, 152-53 (1989).
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acy was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. 73 Similarly, the law
of evidence requires statements against a co-conspirator to be made in
furtherance of the conspiracy in order to be admitted into evidence.74
The Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(2)(E) states:
Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if -
... (2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against
a party and is
... (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and
in furtherance of the conspiracy.
This hearsay exception is "firmly established" in the context of the
law of conspiracy. 75 There exists a plethora of cases that interpret the
term "in furtherance of" in the contexts of the rules of evidence and the
law of conspiracy. Conversations dealing "with such topics as selling
drugs, arranging delivery and payment, reassuring each other of trust-
worthiness, and discussing the current status of the conspiracy" are
clearly made in furtherance of the conspiracy and are admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule.76
The broad phrase "in furtherance of" serves the prosecution well
for purposes of the admissibility of hearsay or bringing conduct within
the scope of a conspiracy. Courts construe this phrase broadly so as not
to defeat the purpose of the exception to the hearsay rule. The law recog-
nizes that co-conspirators are partners in crime, and deems them each to
be agents of the others. Thus, the "in furtherance of" requirement is
analogous to the agency theory "in the scope of the agent's authority. '77
Considerations of both fact and policy dictate against such an ex-
pansive application in the area of capital punishment. If the term "in
furtherance of" can be interpreted inconsistently with the legislative pur-
pose, the law should be amended to clearly state the specific relationship
necessary between the killing and the business of the enterprise.78 Courts
73. 18 U.S.C. § 371.
74. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
75. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443 (1949). The sufficiency of evidence required
under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) to establish that a statement was made in furtherance of and during the
course of a conspiracy is by a preponderance of the evidence. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S.
171 (1987). This standard of proof is to be established through traditional evidentiary means. Pre-
liminary questions of admissibility are established according to Rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which allows a court to rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence to establish the admissibil-
ity of the proposed evidence. See also United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) where the Supreme
Court held that a statement of a co-cofispirator is admissible without showing that the declarant is
unavailable because the co-conspirator's statement is sufficiently reliable.
76. United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1989).
77. United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1978).
78. Conspiratorial overt acts need not be themselves criminal in nature. Innocent acts that
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may interpret this language in section 848 to include a variety of killings
categorized as "in furtherance of" a CCE.
In the rush to address the nation's drug problem, Congress may
have overlooked the potential breadth of this language. Because reason-
able interpretations of this phrase include killings by addicts and other
low level workers in the CCE, but which are not necessarily killings in
furtherance of the CCE, the statutory language should be amended to
limit the law's application to killings demonstrated to be in furtherance
of the CCE and eliminate the prong of liability for death in cases where
the defendant worked in furtherance of the CCE. The issue is whether
such a potentially broad judicial interpretation is consistent with a sound
congressional policy decision. Death is only appropriate under this stat-
ute if the killing was in furtherance of the CCE, regardless of whether the
killing took place while working in furtherance of the CCE. Again, the
issue is not the validity of capital punishment but, rather, the statute's
broad language which reaches a variety of conduct.
B. Status of Defendants
One significance of this amendment is that it focuses on a certain
class of defendants. The statute can be viewed, due to the enhanced pen-
alty of death, as punishing status rather than conduct. A consistent
theme throughout the legislative history is concern over the killing com-
mitted by significant drug kingpins, dealers and importers. 79 Two indi-
viduals who commit the same act with the same state of mind-i.e.,
intentional killings-may receive different punishments. In fact, a per-
son can kill in a manner more heinous than the defendant under the
statute, but because he is not a kingpin or major drug dealer or importer,
that person will not be subject to the death penalty. 80 When individuals
further the criminal venture will suffice. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); United States
v. Rose, 590 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1978).
The nature of the scope of a conspiracy depends on the facts of each case and, therefore, a
determination as to what constitutes "in furtherance of" testimony varies from case to case. United
States v. Mackey, 571 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1978).
79. See supra note 59.
80. This criticism is reflected in the observations of the New York Bar Association:
The legislation is focused upon a class of defendants rather than the class of victims. In
our judgement, this distinction makes no sense. For example, why, after all, should the
organized crime figure who intentionally kills a law enforcement officer to avoid apprehen-
sion for obstruction of justice arising from the contract killing of a potential witness be
viewed as less threatening to society or even less deserving of the death penalty than the
Federal drug felon who engages in precisely the same conduct?
N.Y. Bar Report, supra note 61, at 622. Of course, Congress often legislates in a given area and
continues to add or modify penalties step-by-step. The absence of a death penalty for other crimes
does not negate the validity of the penalty set forth in section 848 (e).
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are put to death it should be for acts committed, not because of status.
Drug dealing activities of the extensive character targeted by Con-
gress is criminal activity of an ongoing and diversified nature. Many of
the daily activities engaged in by individuals connected with the criminal
network are highlighted by the listed aggravating factors. Two-thirds of
the aggravating factors arguably are related to the fact that the defendant
is in a CCE or other major drug organization."' The aggravating factors
reinforce in the jury's mind that they are dealing with a drug kingpin and
may impose death for that reason alone. Although the term "kingpin" is
not an operative element of the law, the status of being a kingpin elevates
the killing to a capital offense under section 848 with the application of
the aggravating factors.8 2
Because the law does not limit "working in furtherance of" to solely
drug-related activities, it is not clear if this clause means that the killing
must be part of an ongoing drug transaction or part of a turf battle be-
tween rival drug gangs.8 3 The law does not say whether drugs must be
81. Aggravating factors in §§ 848(n)(4)(10) and (11) all concern drug related activity. Drug
dealing activity generates huge profits and factors (6) and (7) direct the jury's attention to the mone-
tary profits. Drug dealing on a large scale is an activity that creates a grave risk of death to people
and the kingpins within an organization are individuals who may have had prior convictions in state
court as listed in (2), (3) and (5). Thus two-thirds of the aggravating factors are related to the fact
that the defendant is in a continual drug operation. See infra note 99.
82. Congress focused on the major drug dealers by aggravating any killing to a capital offense
when committed by those connected with the drug network. Clearly Congress wanted to reach drug
kingpins and those on the level of kingpins. See supra note 59.
Similarly, in 1970 Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO") in an effort to reach racketeers and organized crime members. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.
It is clear in the legislative history of RICO that Congress was concerned with the infiltration of
legitimate businesses by organized criminals or racketeers. Although Congress enacted RICO in an
attempt to eradicate organized crime, RICO does not define organized crime. United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587-89 (1981) (RICO was not limited to legitimate businesses, but, rather, an
"enterprise" under RICO included both legitimate and illegitimate organizations).
RICO has been interpreted as focusing on a pattern of criminal conduct, not a specific status.
United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 591 F.2d
1347 (4th Cir. 1979). There would be "many real problems, both constitutional and practical, at-
tendant to implying an organized crime gloss onto RICO." G. Richard Strafer et al., Civil RICO in
the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling", 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 655, 670 (1982); see also Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (unconstitutional to punish for the status of being addicted).
83. The statutory language also reaches those who kill during drug wars or turf battles. Legis-
lative history supports this interpretation. Sen. D'Amato noted that "this bill does hold out the
possibility of the death penalty being utilized, as it relates to the killings of people who themselves are
involved in drug transactions.., drug related murders [are covered that] were the result of drug turf
disputes or disputes in drug dealer transactions .. " 134 CONG. REC. S7469-70 (daily ed. June 9,
1988) (emphasis supplied). He stated that the public's desire to "really have a war on drugs" re-
quires the "ultimate penalty," including targeting for execution those who are "dealing in drugs."
Id. at 7480.
The theory behind this law enforcement strategy is that a universal capital punishment threat
will aid law enforcement in efforts to gain cooperation from the rival drug dealers. In the words of
one Senator:
You will never see a rat run so fast as when he faces the death penalty himself. Get the
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temporally or directly related to the killing. Since section 848 also applies
to the drug dealer who kills another drug dealer, 84 if a rival dealer de-
cides to eliminate his competition by murdering him, this intentional kill-
ing subjects the murderer, upon conviction, to a sentence of death.85
With respect to international kingpins, one Department of Justice
observer opined that the law would be somewhat counter-productive by
stating, "[ilf we imposed the death penalty, we wouldn't be able to get
any of the true drug lords.. ." because most countries do not extradite
individuals who are subject to a capital offense. 86 Rather than allowing
trigger man who goes out and kills another drug person. When he is threatened with the
possibility of the forfeiture of his life, the code of silence is broken.... When they face the
gallows or the electric chair ... they begin to cooperate.
134 CONG. REC. S7495 (daily ed. June 9, 1988) (comments of Sen. D'Amato). Cooperation is often
vital to successful law enforcement. Congressional intent reflects that the desire in this provision was
to deter drug dealers from waging war on law enforcement officers.
84. "[I]t seems almost perverse that Congress chose to exact retribution by making the drug
dealer who kills another drug dealer subject to the enhanced penalty of a death sentence, while the
bank robber who kills an innocent bank employee or law enforcement officer is not." N.Y. Bar
Report, supra note 61, at 623.
At two points in the statute, the law refers to co-felons who may be killed during drug related
violence. For example, in section 848(n)(l)(D)(i), one of the aggravating factors is limited if the
victim is killed as a result of intentional conduct "that the defendant knew would create a grave risk
of death to a person, other than one of the participants in the offense..." Id. (emphasis supplied).
Under section 848(m)(9), if "the victim consented to the criminal conduct that resulted in the vic-
tim's death," this may be considered by the jury as a mitigating factor against the death penalty. Id.
Thus, the killer of the rival drug dealer may be put to death, but the fact that the victim was
engaged in criminality will mitigate against death under this latter section. Further, if the victim
intentionally created a risk of death by virtue of the rival criminal activities, the victim's status
negates a listed aggravating factor under the former section.
85. A proposal was discussed that would eliminate the perceived anomaly of identical punish-
ments of death for killers of rival criminals, police and innocent bystanders. As Senator Levine
commented: "This bill violates I believe common sense, traditional values of our people, in provid-
ing the same penalty for people convicted of the killing of a law enforcement officer or other innocent
people as it provides for people convicted of the killing of a drug czar." 134 CONG. REC. S7492
(daily ed. June 9, 1988).
The proposed amendment provided a more severe penalty for killers of innocent bystanders and
police officers. Because individuals can be released after service of 20 years, the amendment would
provide for mandatory imprisonment without the possibility of release for the killings in place of the
death penalty. It was proposed that one who kills a law enforcement officer would be sentenced to
life without the possibility of parole. Id. at 7492-93.
This alternative would have provided for a maximum sentence of life without parole for the
intentional killing of others engaged in the drug business rather than a death sentence. Otherwise, it
was suggested, the law could become known as the "drug trafficker protection bill."
Without amendment, this bill can be perceived as a "drug czar or a drug trafficker protection
bill." 134 CONG. REC. S7492 (daily ed. June 9, 1988). Sen. Levine cited a survey conducted by his
staff wherein they contacted police departments nationwide. The results revealed that "probably 99
percent of the drug related murders are murders where people in the drug business kill other people
in the drug business. Perhaps 1 percent of the murders are murders of law enforcement and other
innocent people .... Let us protect [the innocents and the police] more strongly than we protect the
99 percent of the victims in drug related murders who are drug czars being bumped off by other drug
people." Id.
86. Richard Gregorie, formerly the Chief Assistant United States Attorney in Miami Florida,
stated that the capital punishment provision of section 848 would interfere with the priority of extra-
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the long arm of the United States government to reach such individuals,
this law may preclude certain types of intervention because of its capital
provision.8 7
While another statutory section sets out the monetary amount that a
kingpin must make from the drug trade,88 the statute contains no mone-
tary minimum that must be attributed to the murderer in order to bring
the killing within this law.8 9 If the law provided that those who kill or
work in furtherance of the CCE also have a financial stake in the crimi-
nal enterprise, this would clearly set forth one direct connection that is
necessary for prosecution under this section. In order to bring all drug
related killings within the scope of the law, Congress apparently intended
that there be no financial conditions precedent to prosecution for these
intentional murders.
C. Law Enforcement Deaths
Under section 848(e)(1)(B), the government does not have to prove
the existence of a CCE as a predicate for the invocation of this statute.
The government need not prove that the defendant engaged in any sub-
stantial drug activities, or that the enterprise grossed in excess of $10
million, or any of the other additional requirements needed to prove a
case under section 848(e)(1)(A). Rather, focus is only on the killing of a
law enforcement officer connected to "any felony violation" of the federal
drug control statutes. The law focuses on the murder victim's status, not
the severity of the underlying offense. Congress intended to deter drug
dealers from waging war on law enforcement with the passage of this
section.
This section states that anyone who intentionally kills a law enforce-
ment officer, "during the commission of, in furtherance of, or while at-
diting kingpins abroad. His comments are reproduced in 134 CONG. REC. H7266 (daily ed. Sept. 8,
1988).
87. 134 CONG. REC. H7275 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1988).
88. 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(2)(B) requires that the enterprise receive $10 million dollars in gross
receipts during any 12 month period (emphasis added).
89. Consistent with the targeting of kingpins, Congress focused on the huge profits reaped in
the criminal drug trade. In discussing this issue prior to passage, Sen. Presler commented that the
legislation "was carefully crafted so the death penalty only would be used in very rare cases. It
would only apply to drug kingpins and those who have profited substantially from selling drugs." 134
CONG. REC. S7585 (daily ed. June 10, 1988) (emphasis added) (this reference is to those who profit
substantially, to those who violate 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(l)(A) and 960(b)(1) and who intentionally
kill). As mentioned, this law as enacted sets no monetary minimum on anyone within the CCE. The
law was designed to target "the middle level management or the kingpins, [not the] trafficker, who is
the one that local police apprehend, [and] is usually a juvenile or some addict...." 134 CONG. REC.
S15968 (daily ed. October 14, 1988). As demonstrated earlier, the law reaches not only the major
importers and distributors who make millions of dollars, but also the low level addict.
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tempting to [avoid the authorities]" for a felony violation of the drug
laws is subject to the death penalty.90 Thus, consider a person, in posses-
sion of a small quantity of marijuana and on probation resulting from
conviction of a similar, previous possession.9' If a probation officer visits
the home of the probationer and is killed by the probationer when the
officer knocks on the door, this killing could fall within section 848 be-
cause the defendant has attempted to "avoid apprehension." Under a
broad interpretation of this statute, if an officer is killed during a domes-
tic disturbance unrelated to drugs, yet the killer is in possession of
drugs,92 he could be subject to the death penalty as the statute is
written.93
"Drug-related" can be as broadly defined as a drug-addicted defend-
ant in possession of marijuana. If the police attempt arrest with use of
firearms, 94 and an officer dies from return fire originating from the fleeing
addict, the addict is subject to the death penalty for possessing drugs and
killing the officer.
This section appears to be needlessly broad in its scope. It is not
clear that Congress intended to reach low-level drug users and include
them within the concept of "drug-related." Congress could have been
specific in requiring that the law enforcement murder be directly related
to the enterprise and drug dealing activity which is proscribed under sec-
tion 848 before it is punishable by death. If, however, the congressional
aim was to punish those who kill law enforcement officers regardless of
the severity of the underlying drug offense, then this goal has been met.
Under the previous example, the addict may be lawfully put to death if
he kills a law enforcement officer.
D. Statutory Aggravating Factors
It is a "fundamental requirement" that the statutory aggravating
factors "must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sen-
90. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(B).
91. 21 U.S.C. §§ 848(e)(1)(B), 844(a). Under section 844(a) first time possession is a misde-
meanor offense but the second possessory offense is a felony.
92. Possession with the intent to distribute is punishable as a felony under 21 U.S.C.
§ 84 1(a)(1). See Roach Comment, supra note 57, at 13.
93. The statute also does not require that the federal felony be a charged offense. Rather sec-
tion 848(e)(B) only states that the killing must be drug related by being committed "during commis-
sion of, in furtherance of, or while attempting to avoid apprehension, prosecution or service of a
prison sentence for" a felony violation of the drug laws. The law has not been interpreted to require
the government to allege and prove the underlying felony violation. See discussion Part IV infra.
94. The use of deadly force by an officer attempting an arrest would in most circumstances
offend Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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tence on the defendant compared to others... ."95 Prior to the adoption
of section 848, Congress did not study the actual application of various
aggravating factors used by the states today. Aggravating factors are of
crucial importance in determining the constitutionality of a particular
death penalty law. Section 848 is structured to divide the aggravating
factors into two groups. The first category of aggravating factors is satis-
fied if
The defendant -
(A) intentionally killed the victim;
(B) intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury which resulted in
the death of the victim;
(C) intentionally engaged in conduct intending that the victim
be killed or that lethal force be employed against the victim; or
(D) intentionally engaged in conduct which
(i) the defendant knew would create grave risk of death to a
person, other than one of the participants in the offense; and
(ii) resulted in the death of the victim. 96
Although aggravating factors are designed to ferret out those most de-
serving of death from among those convicted and eligible for death, the
language of this statute makes clear that any defendant who commits an
offense as defined in section 848(e)(1) satisfies the aggravating factors
listed above and thereby is death-qualified. 97
Because the aggravating factors listed in section 848(n)(1) restate
the mens rea necessary for conviction of the underlying offense, by prov-
ing that this particular defendant is guilty, the prosecutor has already
proven a substantial case for death.98 Section 848(k) requires the sen-
tencer to weigh the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors. In
95. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
96. 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(1).
97. This point was articulated by Sen. Levin who observed that:
There have been no committee hearings on this and no committee report on this bill...
My question is: Why is this an aggravating factor when what it says is, basically, you did
it. These are the elements of the offense. Or to put the question another way, how is this
aggravating factor any different from the elements of the offense?...
How can you be convicted unless you "intentionally killed the victim;" or "intentionally
inflicted serious bodily injury;" or "intentionally engaged in conduct intending," so forth;
or "intentionally engaged in conduct which the defendant knew would create a grave risk
of death to a person?" How can you be convicted of a crime unless you also did one of
those four things...?
134 CONG. REC. S7490 (daily ed. June 9, 1988) (comments of Sen. Levin).
Responding to this line of questioning, Sen. D'Amato opined that this duplication was neces-
sary because the jury considering the sentence may not be the same jury that convicted the defendant
of the crime initially. Id. at 7491 ("There may be a new jury; there may be a new judge as it relates
to the imposition of the death penalty .... I just thought of [this] on the spur of the moment. I
thought it was pretty good."). However, this apparent redundancy in the provision, making inten-
tional homicides both an element of the offense and an aggravating factor, is not satisfactorily ex-
plained in the legislative history.
98. See Lowenfeld v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
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every case the jury must find at least one aggravating factor since the
defendant has already been convicted based on the intentional language
of section 848(n)(1). Although there still must be evidence of an addi-
tional aggravating factor, a prosecutor thus is the beneficiary of judicial
momentum toward death because of the overlap. These factors do not
segregate out those most deserving of death, but rather include as death-
qualified all who have been convicted. The capital sentencing option is
consistently available by virtue of the underlying conviction.
The statute continues to list another group of aggravating factors
that focus on prior convictions for narcotics offenses. The only aggravat-
ing factors that shall be considered, unless notice of additional aggravat-
ing factors is provided, are:
(2) The defendant has been convicted of another Federal offense, or a
State offense resulting in the death of a person, for which a sentence of
life imprisonment or a sentence of death was authorized by statute.
(3) The defendant has previously been convicted of two or more State
or Federal offenses punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than
one year, committed on different occasions, involving the infliction of,
or attempted infliction of, serious bodily injury upon another person.
(4) The defendant has previously been convicted of two or more State
or Federal offenses punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than
one year, committed on different occasions, involving the distribution
of a controlled substance.
(5) In the commission of the offense or in escaping apprehension for a
violation of subsection (e) of this section, the defendant knowingly cre-
ated a grave risk of death to one or more persons in addition to the
victims of the offense.
(6) The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment,
or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value.
(7) The defendant committed the offense as consideration for the re-
ceipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary
value.
(8) The defendant committed the offense after substantial planning and
premeditation.
(9) The victim was particularly vulnerable due to old age, youth or
infirmity.
(10) The defendant had previously been convicted of violating this sub-
chapter or subchapter II of this chapter for which a sentence of five or
more years may be imposed or had previously been convicted of engag-
ing in a continuing criminal enterprise.
(11) The violation of this subchapter in relation to which the conduct
described in subsection (e) of this section occurred was a violation of
section 845 of this title.
(12) The defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous,
cruel, or depraved manner in that it involved torture or serious physi-
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cal abuse to the victim. 99
Aggravating factors (n)(4), (10) and (11) all concern prior criminal
drug activities. Thus, several aggravating items can be found based on
the same underlying criminal conduct.100 Coupled with this is the fact
that the underlying offense is drug-related. The result is that a single
episode of drug-related conduct can satisfy up to four aggravating fac-
tors. This may be precisely what Congress intended. However, this
overlap does not serve as a genuine distinction among murderers.' 0 ' Be-
sides weighing heavily against defendants with prior narcotics convic-
tions, these aggravating factors allow the imposition of death upon a
defendant without aggravating information other than a prior history of
drug dealing coupled with the basic elements of the present conviction. 102
Section 848(j) allows the prosecution to introduce at the sentencing
99. 21 U.S.C. §§ 848(k), (n)(2)-(12).
100. For example, a defendant who has previously been convicted of two violations of section
845, by distributing drugs to persons under the age of 18 satisfies subsection (4), (10), and (11). If a
defendant has two prior federal drug offenses, this conduct may fall under subsections (4) and (10).
101. While the aggravating factors arguably are duplicative and broad, it has been pointed out
that three of the mitigating factors appear to be nullities that would not be relevant at a sentencing
hearing. See N.Y. Bar Report, supra note 61, at 629-630; Roach Comment, supra note 57. Section
848(m)(4) states that the defendant "could not have foreseen that the defendant's conduct in the
course of the commission of murder, or other offense resulting in death for which the defendant was
convicted, would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to any person." Once the jury
has rendered its verdict convicting the defendant of acting intentionally, it is unlikely that a defend-
ant could convince a jury that the death was not foreseeable.
Moreover, the defendant's impaired capacity in section 848(m)(1) and any "severe mental or
emotional disturbance" in 848(m)(7) can mitigate against the imposition of death. Section 848(1),
however, provides that:
Death shall not be carried out upon a person who is mentally retarded. A sentence of
death shall not be carried out upon a person who, as a result of mental disability - (1)
cannot understand the nature of the pending proceedings, what such person was tried for,
the reason for the punishment, or the nature of the punishment; or (2) lacks the capacity to
recognize or understand facts which would make the punishment unjust or unlawful, or
lacks the ability to convey such information to counsel or to the court.
While the Supreme Court has held that it is unconstitutional to execute the insane, Ford v. Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and those under the age of sixteen when the crime was committed,
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), the Court declined to extend this protection to the
mentally retarded in Penry v. Lynaugh, 493 U.S. 302 (1989).
By virtue of section 848(l), since a sentence of death cannot be carried out against one who
suffers from mental retardation or mental disability, the two mitigating factors relating to impaired
capacity and emotional disturbance appear to be of little value to a defendant. On the other hand,
inclusion of these seemingly irrelevant mitigating factors provides a dual protection for the mentally
disturbed. Should a prosecutor successfully convict a defendant who is mentally retarded or who
suffers from a mental disability, arguably, sections 848(m)(1) and (7) afford double protection in
addition to section 848(l). But the sentencer must find that the defendant acted under severe mental
or emotional disturbance. See § 848(m)(7). Thus it may be reasonable for jurors to believe that they
can only consider that the defendant acted under severe mental or emotional disturbance but that
they cannot consider significant mental or emotional disturbance as a mitigating factor.
102. Roach Comment, supra note 57. "As a result, in many cases several aggravating factors
will be found based on the same underlying conduct. In a more carefully drafted statute, the defend-
ant's involvement in drug-related activities would at most constitute a single aggravating factor"; see
also N.Y. Bar Report, supra note 61, at 620-21, 626.
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proceeding evidence obtained possibly in violation of a defendant's con-
stitutional rights. This section allows the jury to consider evidence "re-
gardless of the admissibility of that evidence under the rules governing
the admission of evidence at criminal trials, except that information may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury."' 0 3 Evidence that is inadmissible at the trial' could be admitted
at the sentencing phase under the language of this section, including ille-
gally seized evidence.105
Despite the language of section 848(j), courts should consider more
carefully the admissibility of evidence obtained via a constitutional viola-
tion affecting the substantive rights of the defendant. 106 The heightened
103. 21 U.S.C. § 848(j). This language is taken from Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence:
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considera-
tions of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
104. For example, if it was shown to the satisfaction of the trial judge that a confession was
coerced from the defendant, it would be excluded as a violation of the Miranda holding. Under the
language of section 848(j), such evidence could be presented by the government against the defend-
ant at the sentencing phase "regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of
evidence at criminal trials." 21 U.S.C. § 848(j).
At the sentencing hearing, prosecutors routinely introduce evidence of a defendant's past crimi-
nal record, evidence that is not usually admissible on the question of guilt. A defendant can take the
stand at the sentencing hearing and testify without the fear of incrimination, in mitigation of punish-
ment. Generally, the rules of evidence are inapplicable during sentencing hearings.
The Model Penal Code also allows that all relevant evidence come in at the time of the sentenc-
ing phase. "Any such evidence not legally privileged, which the Court deems to have probative
force, may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, pro-
vided that the defendant's counsel is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962).
105. This is the standard for admission of evidence at bond hearings as well as at sentencing
hearings. See United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (evidence seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment may be used against a defendant at the time of the sentencing hearing
under the sentencing guidelines because of the explicit mandate from Congress that "no limitation"
be placed on relevant evidence in arriving at a guidelines sentence).
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3661, the sentencing judge may consider
any information that has a "sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy." United
States v. Marshall, 519 F. Supp. 751 (D. Wis. 1981), aff'd, 719 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1983). This would
include reliable hearsay evidence and out-of-court declarations of an unidentified informant. For
example, evidence of prior bad acts can be excluded at trial under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Such evidence may come in, however, at the time of sentencing. The Federal Rules of
Evidence do not apply to the sentencing hearing. FED. R. EVID. 1 101(d)(3).
106. The author recognizes that the court routinely admits hearsay evidence and other evidence
during the sentencing hearing that would otherwise be inadmissible. See discussion supra notes 103-
105. Recently, the District of Columbia Circuit held that illegally seized evidence is admissible
under the federal sentencing guidelines. The court recognized the wide discretion to consider all
relevant evidence without limitation. United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2) (1962) ("Any such evidence not legally privileged, which the
Court deems to have probative force, may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclu-
sionary rules of evidence, provided that the defendant's counsel is accorded a fair opportunity to
rebut any hearsay statements.").
Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979), addressed the admissibility of hearsay evidence offered on
19911
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importance of fact-finding in death penalty cases may require a stricter
test or a heavier burden when the question is the life or death decision
under consideration. The Supreme Court has recognized that death is a
uniquely different sanction, unlike all others in its severity and finality,
and "in capital proceedings generally.. . factfinding procedures [should]
aspire to a heightened standard of reliability." °1 0 7 Thus, at the death pen-
alty phase, additional safeguards should be required.
While the traditional rules of evidence do not generally apply in sen-
tencing hearings, a significant number of states have altered that policy in
death penalty sentencing hearings. Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Ne-
vada, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas all fol-
low the same approach in this matter. These states grant that relevant
evidence is generally admissible, regardless of the rules of evidence, but
with the stipulation that the statute shouldn't be construed to authorize
introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the federal Constitu-
tion, or the constitution of a particular state. 108 The Florida Supreme
Court stated: "It is clear that whenever evidence is suppressed because it
was seized in violation of the 4th or 5th Amendments, this statute pro-
hibits its introduction during the penalty phase unless there is an appro-
priate exception .. ."109
Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New
Jersey take a different approach, differentiating between evidence offered
by the state to establish aggravating circumstances, and evidence offered
in support of mitigating circumstances. Generally, evidence offered by
either party regarding mitigation is not bound by the rules of evidence,
while information relevant to aggravating factors is bound by those
behalf of a defendant at the sentencing phase. The Supreme Court held that "[i]n these unique
circumstances the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanically to defeat the ends of [J]ustice." Id.
at 97 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). Courts will carefully examine the
limitations on the admissibility of hearsay evidence at the time of sentencing, and not exclude the
proffered information if to do so will affect the defendant's substantive rights. The defense is able to
introduce evidence without regard to the rules of evidence under a broad interpretation of section
848(j). For a discussion of the types of evidence proffered on behalf of defendants at the time of
sentencing, see WHITE, supra note 4, at 97-111.
107. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986).
108. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(d); FLA. STAT. ch. 921.141(l)(1985); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 99-1-
101 (Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.552 (1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10(d)(1983);
TENN. ANN. § 39-204(c)(1991); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.01 (West Supp. 1992). These
laws generally state that any evidence with probative value and relevance to the sentence shall be
received at the sentencing hearing, but this is not to be construed to allow introduction of any
evidence secured in violation of the state or federal Constitution.
109. Harach v. State, 437 So.2d 1082, 1085-1086 (Fla. 1983). See, Mhoon v. States, 464 So.2d 77
(Miss. 1985)(an incriminating statement elicited from the defendant by 5th and 6th Amendment
violations is inadmissible in the sentencing phase).
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rules.110 Louisiana, Missouri, and Virginia have taken the most con-
servative approach and applied the rules of evidence as in the guilt
phase. 11
The limitations placed by the majority of states is only that the evi-
dence be relevant, reliable, probative and/or subject to the discretion of
the judge. Nonetheless, a significant minority of the states have found a
need to apply the protection afforded by the exclusionary rule to death
penalty sentencing proceedings. The policies behind the exclusionary
rule may not necessarily be served by enforcement during the sentencing
proceedings, as there would normally be minimal deterrent impact upon
law enforcement officers. However, in a proceeding as significant as a
death penalty sentencing, there seems to be a growing trend reflected
among the states that the exclusionary rule should still be observed.
Congress may have meant to exclude unconstitutionally seized evi-
dence where the admission of such evidence affects the substantive rights
of a capital defendant. The courts may well interpret this section by
reading in this exclusion. At the time where an individual's life is at
stake, at this most critical point in the prosecution, the Constitution
should not be abandoned in favor of a lenient standard of admissibility.
E. Competency of Counsel
Section 848 provides for the appointment of "one or more attorneys
and the furnishing of such other services" as required.112 The statute sets
minimum standards for the legal counsel who may be appointed to repre-
sent the capital defendant. 1 3 In setting these minimum standards, Con-
gress must have been mindful of the research suggesting that competency
110. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(c)(1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(4) (Michie 1987);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(c) (West 1985); IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 9-1(e) (Smith-Hurd
1992); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 68 (West Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-
3)c)(2)(b) (West Supp. 1991).
111. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.2 (West 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.006(l)(Vemon 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1991).
112. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(A). In addition, the court may, in its discretion and exparte, author-
ize the payment for investigative, expert or other services necessary for the defense of the case or for
the sentencing proceeding. Id. § 848(q)(9).
113. Id. § 848(q)(5) states:
If the appointment is made before judgment, at least one attorney so appointed must have
been admitted to practice in the court in which the prosecution is to be tried for not less
than five years, and must have had not less than three years experience in the actual trial of
felony prosecutions in that court.
A similar requirement is stated for appointments occurring after judgment:
If the appointment is made after judgment, at least one attorney so appointed must have
been admitted to practice in the court of appeals for not less that five years, and must have
had not less that three years experience in the handling of appeals in that court in felony
cases.
Id. § 848(q)(6).
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of counsel plays a critical role in the determination of who is put to death
in this country. Section 848 recognizes the complexity of capital repre-
sentation when it says that any appointment shall last from the pretrial
stages through trial, sentencing, (unlike some state laws) through appeal,
post-conviction proceedings and the filing of any writ to the Supreme
Court.1 14 This representation encompasses a variety of settings and re-
quires a great deal of legal expertise and specialization in each distinct
phase of the proceeding.
Capital defendants frequently suffer the consequences of being put
to death because their trial counsel are ill-equipped to handle capital
cases.1l 5 Counsel must be thoroughly knowledgeable about a very com-
plex body of constitutional and procedural laws specific to capital litiga-
tion and not commonly applicable to other criminal cases. It is
commonly understood that the representation of a capital defendant is an
extraordinary responsibility even for conscientious and experienced
counsel. ' 16
Representation of the defendant charged with a capital crime often
involves the most heinous killers and gruesome facts. The requirement
that the trial be bifurcated from the sentencing phase means two trials
with two distinct sets of issues and strategies. Pre-trial investigation can
be extensive, since it involves both the question of guilt and the query
into the critical sentencing considerations. Penalty phase investigation
114. Section 848(q)(8) states:
[Elach attorney . . . shall represent the defendant throughout every subsequent stage of
available judicial proceedings, including pretrial proceedings, trial, sentencing, motions for
new trial, appeals, applications for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States, and all available post-conviction process, together with applications for stays of
execution and other appropriate motions and procedures, and shall also represent the de-
fendant in such competency proceedings and proceedings for executive or other clemency
as may be available to the defendant.
115. Death penalty litigation has become a specialized field of practice, and even the most
well intentioned attorneys often are unable to recognize, preserve, and defend their client's
rights. Often trial counsel simply are unfamiliar with the special rules that apply in capital
cases. Counsel-whether appointed or retained-often are handling their first criminal
cases, or their first murder cases, when confronted with the prospect of a death penalty.
Though acting in good faith, they inevitably make very serious mistakes.
Thurgood Marshall, Remarks on the Death Penalty Made at the Judicial Conference of the Second
Circuit, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1986).
116. Most lawyers do not want to handle death cases. The work is hard and unrewarding, the
issues are complex and often there is very little or no compensation.
For the local lawyer representing a capital client in an atmosphere of outrage, fear, or
racial hostility, [the demand of the profession] has always been a grueling one. But in a
legal climate that is increasingly poisoned by the Supreme Court's own denigration of capi-
tal appeals, and the petitioners and lawyers who bring them, only the super-human lawyer
may be able to resist the temptation to approach her client and her task with scorn, distaste
or resignation.
Julia E. Boaz, Note, Summary Process and the Rule of Law: Expediting Death Penalty Cases in the
Federal Courts, 95 YALE L.J. 349, 361 (1985).
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involves delving into issues about the defendant's family, personal and
psychological history because of the importance of such information at
the time of sentencing. This investigation must be completed prior to the
criminal trial.
There are numerous documented instances of inadequate legal rep-
resentation" 7 ranging from no legal representation at all,'18 to ignorance
of the current case law directly on point with the issues pending during
the criminal litigation," 9 to ignorance of the capital procedural require-
ments,' 20 to unfamiliarity with the state's capital statute.' 2' Counsel's
failure to investigate 22 or present mitigating evidence, 23 and even one
instance where an attorney conceded the client's guilt, 24 are further ex-
amples of inadequate legal assistance. In some cases the difference be-
tween the competence of counsel resulted in the death of a defendant
where the co-defendant's life was spared because co-counsel raised the
relevant legal issue. 12 5
Moreover, plea bargaining in capital cases is a powerful factor in
deciding who is ultimately put to death. Skilled and well-prepared de-
fense counsel can cause the prosecutor to engage in plea bargaining
where this might not otherwise occur. 126 Jury selection poses special
117. See, e.g., Tom Wicker, Defending the Indigent in Capital Cases, 2 CRIM. JUsr. ETHics 2
(1983) (noting that there is a pattern of incompetent counsel in capital cases).
118. See, e.g., House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608, 612 (11th Cir.) (counsel not even present during
portions of capital trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984); Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 792, 795 (11 th
Cir. 1982) (counsel failed to provide "even a modicum of professional assistance at any time" during
capital trial).
119. See, e.g., Brooks v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.), cert. and stay of execution denied, 459
U.S. 1061 (1982); Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d, 794, 817-20 (11th Cir. 1982) (conviction and
death sentence set aside because counsel was unaware of the law and rendered ineffective assistance,
and distanced himself from his client), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983).
120. See Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 741, 797-98 (11 th Cir. 1982) (counsel unaware that sentencing
phase followed finding of guilt).
121. See id. at 799; House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 603, 613 (11th Cir. 1984).
122. See, e.g., Curry v. Zany, 258 Ga. 526, 371 S.E.2d 647, 649 (1988) (counsel ineffective for
failing to obtain independent psychiatric evaluation of the defendant in order to determine
competency).
123. See, e.g., Knighton v. Maggio, 105 S. Ct. 32, 33 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Thomas v.
Kemp, 796 F.2d 1322, 1324-25 (11 th Cir.) (death sentence vacated because counsel failed to present
any evidence in mitigation), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 996 (1986).
124. Francis v. Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190, 1193 (11 th Cir. 1983) (defense counsel conceded guilt
during the closing argument).
125. Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1476 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (defendant
executed because lawyer failed to raise unconstitutional jury selection; co-defendant raised identical
issue and was granted a new trial and client sentenced to life); Stanley v. Kemp, 737 F.2d 921 (11 th
Cir. 1987) (defendant executed because attorney did not raise issue of improper burden shifting
instruction; more culpable co-defendant granted relief on same issue in Thomas v. Zant, 800 F.2d
1024 (11 th Cir. 1986)).
126. For example, a well prepared, experienced counsel can cause the prosecutor to offer a plea
bargain by filing meritorious pretrial motions, or numerous time consuming motions, secure the
expertise of persons who will testify on behalf of the defendant and who will require the prosecutor
1991]
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problems not usually considered by competent and experienced criminal
law practitioners. Counsel may have an ethical obligation to ask for pri-
vate, individualized voir dire and to select people with an open mind on
the question of death. ' 27 There is a continuing duty to discover all evi-
dence that may be offered in mitigation of death in order to ensure a
meaningful penalty phase. This duty may involve extensive investigative
work on the part of the attorney, not of the type previously engaged in by
the attorney in a non-capital criminal practice.
After the trial, the penalty phase of a capital case makes it radically
different from all other criminal trials.' 28 Ordinarily little thought is
given to the sentencing until the defendant has been found guilty. But in
a capital case, the attorney must prepare for both phases before trial
since it is likely that a court will proceed with the sentencing phase im-
mediately after a finding of guilt.1 29
At the sentencing phase of a capital case the attorney must be an
advocate for life and affirmatively present evidence on behalf of the cli-
ent. No presentence report may be required.' 30 "A capital sentencing
proceeding ... is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in
the existence of standards for decision ... that counsel's role in the pro-
ceeding is comparable to counsel's role at trial . . . 131
Even experienced practitioners can find themselves in unfamiliar
territory. Defense attorneys are accustomed to reacting to the govern-
ment's case and meeting the prosecution's burden of proof. In the capital
sentencing phase, the roles are reversed. Defense counsel must "ensure
that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under
to similarly hire an expert, or delay the trial until a time when it is politically expedient to dispose of
the case. Moreover, the personal relationship between the prosecutor and the defense attorney can
play an important role in whether a plea bargain is offered. See WHITE, supra note 4, at 54-57.
127. In fact, in a capital case, 18 U.S.C. § 3432 provides: "A person charged with treason or
other capital offense shall at least three entire days before commencement of trial be furnished with a
copy of the.., list of the veniremen, and of the witnesses to be produced on the trial ... stating the
place of abode of each venireman and witness." This provision allows counsel the opportunity to
conduct thorough pretrial investigation. This section departs from the common practice in federal
courts by giving prior notice of jurors' and witnesses' names and addresses.
128. A capital case is really two different, but related, proceedings. "The differences are so fun-
damental that counsel quite able to try a complex criminal case may not be competent to handle a
penalty trial in a capital case." Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 303 (1983) (discussing the many ways that a capital
case is different from any other felony trial).
129. At a non-capital criminal sentencing, the defense attorney's professional efforts on behalf of
the client basically conclude once the major task is over: the client has been found guilty and all that
remains is for the court to sentence the defendant. Although a thorough presentence report may be
presented to the court, all relevant defense information has usually already been included in such a
report.
130. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(j) (West Supp. 1991).
131. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984).
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the standards governing decision:"132 presenting evidence and bearing
the burden of convincing the jury to impose life. Thus, the trial strategy
during the guilt stage is markedly different from the sentencing
strategy. 13 3
The American Bar Association Task Force on Death Penalty
Habeas Corpus focused in 1989 on the effectiveness of trial counsel as a
critical problem in capital cases, recognizing that "many of the proce-
dures involved in the trial and review of death penalty cases turn on the
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of trial counsel." 134 The ABA Report rec-
ognized what was widely known: capital litigation is complex. It is a
specialized field of practice within the criminal law and defense counsel
must be familiar with the special procedural rules that apply. 135 It is fair
to say that there is a small, discrete group of practitioners who routinely
handle capital defendants with a relative degree of expertise. t36
132. Id. at 687.
133. Goodpaster, supra note 128, at 329-30. Added to these concerns, counsel who undertake
representation in capital cases often suffer judicial chastisement for pursuing legal avenues available
to the client. They may be perceived as attempting to "frustrate valid judgments after painstaking
judicial review over a number of years," Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237, 1240 (1983), or attempting to
turn "the administration of justice into a sporting contest," Sullivan v. Wainwright, 464 U.S. 109,
112 (1983) (Burger, J., concurring).
134. IRA P. ROBBINS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION TASK FORCE ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS 48 (1989) [hereinafter ABA Report].
The report concluded that:
[D]eath penalty litigation is extraordinarily complex, both for the courts and for the attor-
neys involved. Not only do the cases incorporate the evidentiary and procedural issues
that are associated with virtually every noncapital case, but they also involve a host of
issues that are unique to capital cases. These issues include: special voir dire of jurors;
presentation of evidence going to guilt or innocence and to punishment; special penalty
procedures, including additional factual findings by the jury; proportionality review (under
some state appellate procedures); and critical questions of competence of counsel.
Id. at 43.
135. Id.; see also Marshall, supra note 115, at 1-3.
136. ABA Report, supra note 134, at 49. This group of practitioners is most likely drawn from
the ranks of former assistant state defenders and assistant state prosecutors. These individuals have
had the most concentrated practical experience with death penalty cases within a given jurisdiction.
The pool of competent practitioners able and willing to handle a capital defense is small. There
are several factors that may account for the lack of practitioners. Whenever the defendant is finan-
cially unable to pay for privately retained counsel, the court will usually assign the case to the local
public defenders office. It is widely known that these offices are overworked and burnout is high.
The turnover is great and there is a constant new crop of young lawyers who are learning how to try
cases, including capital cases. If there is a conflict of interest because the public defender cannot
represent more than one defendant charged in the same indictment, the court must appoint outside
counsel from the bar association.
The standard for pay is low compared to the amount of money that can be commanded within
the private sector. While it is clear that a defendant is only entitled to competent counsel, not
counsel of her choice, the amount of pay directly impacts the quality of legal effort put forth. ABA
Report, supra note 134, at 61-65. For example, it is not unusual for the fee of $1000 to be provided
by statute for the representation of a criminal defendant charged with a capital crime. This amount
may represent the entire sum of money available for the case. Almost every criminal case will
quickly exhaust this sum just with the research and pretrial preparation needed to perform ade-
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The Supreme Court has defined what is ineffective representation in
the context of capital litigation. In Strickland v. Washington,' 37 the
Supreme Court defined the constitutional floor for attorney conduct:
"[tihe benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the [proceeding] cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result."' 38 In order for a defendant to show, constitu-
tionally, that her counsel was ineffective, there are
two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's per-
formance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made er-
rors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel"
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the de-
fendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the de-
fense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 139
In order to show deficient performance, the defendant must prove
that her lawyer's representation was below the reasonableness standard,
measured by "prevailing professional norms." 14 Any such showing
faces the "strong presumption" of constitutionally adequate assist-
ance. 41 A "heavy measure of deference" applies to counsel's representa-
tional decisions.142 As the Court said, "the purpose of the effective
assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the qual-
ity of legal representation, although that is a goal of considerable impor-
tance to the legal system. The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal
defendants receive a fair trial."1 43
Furthermore, even though there may be a body of criminal practi-
tioners experienced with the handling of capital proceedings in the state
courts, many state practitioners do not regularly practice in federal
court. Any appointed practitioner must not only be admitted to practice
in federal court, but also should be experienced with capital cases. Up
until now, death penalty experience meant state court experience because
there have not been any federal death penalty cases since before the 1972
Furman decision.144
quately. It is not clear whether a defendant receives competent representation or only $1000 worth
of representation.
137. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
138. Id. at 686.
139. Id. at 687.
140. Id. at 690.
141. Id. at 689. The presumption was that the action taken at the trial "might be considered
sound trial strategy." Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
142. Id. at 691.
143. Id. at 689.
144. The last federal execution occurred in 1963 when Victor Feuger was hung in Iowa for
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Since section 848 requires both that the appointed counsel be admit-
ted to federal court for five years and, in addition, have three years of
federal criminal trial experience, the federal courts might have difficulty
locating competent counsel for appointment to capital cases.' 45 In addi-
tion, because this is a new statute, there is not a body of law or resources
for the appointed counsel to rely upon in representing the defendant.' 46
The backup and supporting consultation so vital in this specialized area
of the law is lacking. 14 7
Recognizing that it might be difficult to locate defense counsel who
meet the statutorily defined standards, section 848 states further: "[t]he
court, for good cause, may appoint another attorney whose background,
knowledge, or experience would otherwise enable him or her to properly
represent the defendant, with due consideration to the seriousness of the
possible penalty and to the unique and complex nature of the litiga-
tion.148 This section authorizes the appointment of an additional attor-
ney should the primary attorney be lacking in experience to adequately
represent the defendant. This is a very real possibility, given the com-
plexities of capital practice in general and the uniqueness of this statute
in particular.
Practitioners with experience in state capital cases will undoubtedly
constitute the majority of the pool of attorneys the court will appoint
under this statute. The above-cited section was probably written to ad-
dress this reality, since state practitioners may not have the requisite
number of years of federal practice, and, therefore, it is likely that they
murder and kidnapping. First Death Under Drug Law is Favored by Alabama Jury, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 1991, at A20; Tony Mauro, 28 Years Since Last Federal Execution, USA TODAY, Mar. 14,
1991, at 3A; U.S. to Push for Death Penalty in a Drug Slaying, N.Y. TIMEs, May 12, 1990, § 1, at 10.
145. See discussion of Pitera case, infra Part IV. The first appointments will most likely be
assigned to the Federal Public Defenders who serve the court by representing indigent defendants in
each federal district court nationwide. Because this is a new statute, it is fair to assume that none of
the federal public defenders have federal experience with death penalty litigation. This is not to
ignore the possibility that the federal public defender may have had previous state capital experience.
Nevertheless, section 848 is distinctively different from state capital schemes.
The securing of competent counsel to represent defendants in capital cases is difficult. Often,
when a lawyer takes one case on a volunteer basis or for low pay, he or she is reluctant to do so
again. Therefore, there is little incentive for lawyers to develop any expertise in capital practice.
ABA Report, supra note 134, at 61.
146. Resource centers have been established in some states to address the problem of strengthen-
ing trial counsel through recruitment, training, monitoring and other assistance in appointed cases.
ABA Report, supra note 134, at 58-59; see also Judicial Conference Semi-Annual Meeting Decisions
Announced, BULL. OF THE FED. CTS. (Third Branch), Apr. 1989, at 1, 6 (authorizing the formation
of "expert consultant" panels to assist appointed counsel).
147. This deficiency will eventually remedy itself as more and more attorneys become familiar
with the law. The critical inquiry, however, is who suffers because of the learning process.
148. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(7).
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might not otherwise fall within the statutorily defined pool of potential
appointees.
The section requiring federal litigation experience clearly demon-
strates Congress' attempt to insure that the most competent defense
counsel was available for appointment to death penalty cases. In reality,
however, those with the most up-to-date capital defense experience will
be the current or former assistant state attorney or the local assistant
public defender who may have defended, prosecuted or negotiated pleas
in numerous capital cases on the state level. But under the statute, the
local practitioners may be excluded because they do not have the requi-
site number of years of federal experience and do not fall under the statu-
tory standards.
The catch-all section allowing the court to appoint "another" attor-
ney in the case was probably intended to insure that the attorneys with
this valuable local capital experience were available under this law. In-
stead of being optional, this section should be mandatory and require at
least three years of relevant capital felony experience. Otherwise, if the
court appoints someone with the statutory number of years of federal
trial court experience, this person might not be skilled in the nuances of
capital litigation, even though they meet the statutory requirements. If
none of the counsel has ever tried a capital case, the standards are mean-
ingless because of the crucial differences between capital litigation and
other criminal litigation outlined above. If the law were amended to re-
quire mandatory capital litigation, the courts would avoid the appoint-
ment of counsel to a defense involving novel litigation where life is at
stake.
However, the situation is more alarming in those fourteen states that
do not have a death penalty law.' 49 For example, within the Seventh
Circuit Wisconsin does not have a death penalty statute. Presumably
there are very few Wisconsin attorneys who have any up-to-date practi-
cal experience with federal or state capital cases. Since no state capital
cases are prosecuted, neither the public defenders nor the district attor-
neys have any state court experience with death penalty litigation.
As another example, New York also does not have a state death
penalty. New York does, however, have a growing drug problem with
associated violence and drug-related killings. It is reasonable to assume
that persons admitted to the bar of New York who have practiced exclu-
sively within the state have no practical experience with the death
149. See supra note 15.
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penalty. ' 50
The drafters of the law should have required more than the bare
minimum of representation: one of the appointed counsel should have at
least three years of experience with capital cases. As it now stands, the
law only requires that the attorney have federal felony experience. As
pointed out, this does not necessarily satisfy the question of competence
in capital cases because of the unique and complex nature of death pen-
alty cases. Much of the current backlog in our courts is directly related
to inadequate, but constitutionally sanctioned, legal representation.15'
F Appellate Review
Sections 84 8(q)(2) and (3) say that the appellate court should review
the record, the evidence submitted during the trial, the information
submitted during the sentencing hearing, the procedures employed in
the sentencing hearing, and the special findings returned under this
section .. . [and affirm the death sentence if]
(3)(A) the sentence of death was not imposed under the influence
of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and
(B) the information supports the special finding of the existence of
every aggravating factor upon which the sentence was based, together
with, or the failure to find, any mitigating factors as set forth or al-
lowed in this section. 15 2
The law does not provide for review of the sentence to determine
whether the sentence is excessively harsh in comparison to the defend-
ant's involvement in the crime, whether the imposition of death in any
given case is a fundamental miscarriage of justice or whether any consti-
tutional violation resulted in the conviction of an innocent individual. 53
It limits appellate review to the enumerated subjects. By comparison,
thirty-four states have a provision calling for automatic review of all
death sentences, typically by the highest state court. 54 To the extent
that the language of section 848(q)(3) limits "meaningful appellate re-
150. See discussion of Pitera case, infra Part IV. Of course, some practitioners have extensive
national criminal litigation experience, including capital cases.
151. It is critical that trial counsel perform adequately since competent trial counsel will insure
that fewer constitutional errors occur that can infect the conviction and sentence and add to the
courts' backlog.
152. 21 U.S.C. §§ 848(q)(2), (3)(A) and (B).
153. Statewide review of death penalty cases has caused the courts to vacate several sentences of
death after determining that the imposition of capital punishment in particular cases was not war-
ranted because of the crime, the defendant's personal history or the comparison to similarly situated
defendants who did not receive a sentence of death. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 72-73 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
154. Department of Justice Bulletin, Death Penalty Statistics, p. 5, October 1989. Both Indiana
and Illinois call for automatic review by each state's supreme court. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-50-2-9(h); 38 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para 9-1(i) (1989).
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view,"' 5 5 this section should be expanded to allow appellate review of all
issues germane to both the conviction and the imposition of the death
sentence. '
56
Although proportionality review is not constitutionally man-
dated, 57 many states provide for automatic appeal' 58 and mandatory re-
view of all death sentences imposed to determine whether the sentence is
disproportionate to that imposed in other cases.' 59 As Justice Stevens
stated in his concurrence in Pulley, "some form of meaningful appellate
review is an essential safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious im-
position of death sentences by individual juries and judges."' 6°
IV. THEORIES OF PROSECUTION
As of this writing, the government has sought the death penalty
under this law in eight cases. In 1989 the government sought the imposi-
155. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. at 56 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
156. In an effort to alleviate the log jam of death row appeals choking the judicial process, the
Supreme Court again made it more difficult for convicted criminals on death row to challenge their
convictions and sentences in the federal courts. Recently, the Supreme Court limited the number of
times that a death row inmate could raise in a federal habeas corpus petition questions raised in
previous petitions. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991). The McCleskey Court held that after
the government demonstrated that a prior writ of habeas corpus had been filed that excluded certain
claims, the burden shifted to the petitioner to demonstrate that he had cause for the failure to in-
clude every viable claim in the original petition. Id. at 1470.
The McCleskey opinion permits successive petitions to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of
justice. "The cause and prejudice standard we adopt today leaves ample room for consideration of
constitutional errors in a first federal habeas petition and in a later petition under appropriate cir-
cumstances." Id. at 1475.
See also Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 111 S. Ct. 2590 (1991) (barring federal court review of a state
habeas claim unless the claimant can establish "cause and prejudice" for a procedural default); Cole-
man v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in capital case
does not amount to an independent constitutional violation where claimant defaulted on his federal
claim because of an independent and adequate state procedural rule).
157. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. at 45. Although not constitutionally required, the Supreme
Court has said that such review is an additional safeguard against arbitrarily imposed executions. In
Indiana proportionality review is not required. The court has stated that the death penalty statute
provides sufficient procedures and structure in order to prevent arbitrary application. See, e.g.,
Townsend v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1215, 1230 (Ind. 1989). Similarly, while not requiring proportional-
ity review, the Illinois courts have applied such a review in limited circumstances, such as when
comparing the sentences between co-defendants. See, e.g., People v. Jimerson, 535 N.E.2d 889, 908
(Ill. 1989).
158. See, e.g., 38 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(i) (1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9.
159. Over 30 states require some sort of comparative proportionality review of death sentences.
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(c)(3) (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-3.e. David C. Baldus
et al., Identifying Comparatively Excessive Sentences of Death: A Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 2-3, n.2 (1980).
As discussed in the Pulley case, traditional proportionality review is a "reference to an abstract
evaluation of the appropriateness of a sentence for a particular crime." Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. at
42-43. Comparative proportionality review questions whether the death sentence is "unacceptable
in a particular case because disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the
same crime." Id. at 43.
160. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. at 59 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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tion of the death penalty against two men in Chicago in a case of first
impression. t6t Alexander Cooper and Darnell Davis were charged with
the murder of a potential government witness in furtherance of a CCE
and cocaine and heroin trafficking conspiracy, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(e)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.162
The counts of the indictment that are pertinent to this discussion
and relate to amended section 848 include Count One, where the govern-
ment alleged that Davis and Cooper conspired to distribute controlled
substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count Two incorporated by
reference all of the allegations contained in Count One and charged
Cooper with a substantive violation of engaging in a CCE in violation of
section 848 (a). Count Three charged that Davis and Cooper, "while
engaged in and working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enter-
prise, intentionally killed and counseled, commanded, induced, procured
and caused the intentional killing of [a government witness], and such
killing resulted."' 63 In Count Fifty-four, Davis was charged with posses-
sion with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1). Davis, unlike Cooper, was not charged with a violation of
the CCE section of 848(a).
The facts established at trial that Cooper, identified as the drug
kingpin, hired Davis to kill Robert Parker, who was cooperating with
federal officials in an investigation of Cooper's drug network. Parker, a
government informant, was found shot to death with 5 bullet wounds to
the head and upper body.
The defendants filed numerous pretrial motions alleging a wide-
ranging constitutional attack on the statute.1 64 Judge Shadur, of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, severed
Davis from the Cooper trial and ordered that Cooper be tried first. The
judge rejected the defense challenges to the two-year-old law. Cooper was
convicted, but after a sentencing hearing where the government urged
161. This is the first case charging a death penalty offense. As of this writing, the Department of
Justice has approved death penalty indictments in Alabama, New York, Texas, New Jersey, Florida,
Virginia, and Georgia.
162. United States v. Cooper, 754 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
163. Count Four charged Davis with intentionally killing this government witness "with the
intent to prevent the communication ... to a law enforcement officer or judge ... of information
relating to the possible commission of a federal offense" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C).
Id. at 620.
164. The defendants argued, inter alia, that section 848 is unconstitutional based on the Fifth,
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, that Count Three (the count that charged Davis and
Cooper with killing "while engaged in and working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enter-
prise") failed to state an offense and was therefore unconstitutionally vague. Id.
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that the death penalty be imposed, the jury declined to impose that sen-
tence. Davis was convicted but the death penalty was not imposed.
The December 21, 1990 opinion of the district court represents the
first judicial opinion addressing the merits of the death penalty provision
of section 848. The court ruled against the defendants on all of the pre-
trial issues related to the constitutionality of the use of the statute in this
case. 165
Because Davis was not charged with engaging in a CCE, the indict-
ment did not allege that the killing took place in connection with a drug
transaction. Davis was charged with "working in furtherance of a con-
tinuing criminal enterprise" at the time of the killing. As discussed ear-
lier, the statute does not define "working in furtherance of a continuing
criminal enterprise," although it does define "engaging in a continuing
criminal enterprise." 166 The issue is a question of statutory vagueness.167
It is likely that even though Congress did not define the term "working in
furtherance of," courts will look to similar broad usage of that term in
the law of conspiracy and the Federal Rules of Evidence. t68
The Illinois prosecution is an example of one way in which Congress
intended to reach the killings committed on the orders of a kingpin.
Since the killer was not engaged in a CCE at the time of the killing, he
was charged with working in furtherance of the CCE. Because the kill-
ing was intended to prevent communication with the authorities about
the drug enterprise, the killing was also in furtherance of the CCE.
The first defendant actually to be sentenced to death under this stat-
ute was David Chandler, who was sentenced in Birmingham, Alabama
on May 14, 1991.169 Chandler was indicted and charged with operating
a substantial marijuana enterprise in a rural part of Northern Alabama.
165. Id. In addition to finding that the statute was constitutionally applied in this prosecution,
the court rejected the defendants' claim that the government did not provide adequate pretrial dis-
covery of the aggravating circumstances upon which it would rely in seeking the death penalty. The
court also rejected the defense attack on section 848(n)(1) based on the argument that the aggravat-
ing factors are duplicative of the underlying offense. In reliance on Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S.
231 (1988), the court noted that the statute requires the jury to find an additional aggravating factor
listed in section 848(n)(2)-(12).
Further, the court rejected other defense arguments, to wit, the statute impermissibly shifted the
burden of proof to the defendant on the mitigating factors, the statute was impermissibly vague, the
anti-discrimination aspect of the law precluded the jury from considering mitigating factors related
to the defendant's race, color, religious beliefs, national origin or sex, and the law infringed on the
defendant's claimed right to a judge imposed rather than a jury imposed sentence.
166. See supra note 40.
167. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). The Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process clause states that a law is invalid when its prohibitions are not clearly stated and defined so
that the citizenry is put on notice of the prohibitions.
168. See discussion supra at notes 70-78.
169. United States v. Chandler, No. 90-H-266-E (N.D. Ala. Jan. 9, 1991).
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His network involved importation, cultivation and distribution of mari-
juana in at least four states. Chandler was convicted of soliciting the
murders of a police informant and two other individuals whom Chandler
believed stole marijuana from his fields.
The admitted killer, Charles Ray Jarrell, Sr., was paid $500.00 by
Chandler to kill the informant. Jarrell entered into a plea agreement
with the government that guaranteed that he would not be subject to a
death sentence. Jarrell then testified against Chandler, pursuant to the
agreement.' 70 This case represents the government's first successful use
of the statute against a non-triggerman kingpin who ordered a killing for
hire. Clearly, the killer was not engaged in the CCE and had no stake in
the financial profits of the enterprise. However, he had worked in fur-
therance of the CCE.
The government's theory of prosecution was that the kingpin caused
the killing by seeking out a murderer, offering to pay for the act and
providing the weapon. This solicitous action subjected Chandler to a
death sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e). 7 1 Using solicitation as a the-
ory raises the issue of cooperation in an effort to gain the advantage of
saving one's life. It stands to reason that those most culpable, for exam-
ple, the kingpin who orders and pays for the murder, will readily accept a
plea bargain that eliminates the possibility of a death sentence by cooper-
ating with the government and fingering the triggerman.
On the other hand, as the government stated in its Response to
Chandler's pre-trial "Motion to Strike and Dismiss Counts Two and
Three of the Indictment,"
In essence, the Government has reached a plea agreement with a low-
level soldier in a drug organization in order to obtain his testimony
against the drug kingpin ... it is the position of the Government that a
defendant who will actively seek others to carry out a murder, offer to
pay money and provide the weapon for the act is a far more dangerous
170. The decision to accept a plea may be inversely related to the defendant's perception of the
chances for an acquittal at trial. See WHITE, supra note 4, at 62. At trial the likelihood of convic-
tion and the possibility of death increases. Criticism of plea bargaining in capital cases focuses on
the dilemma where those most culpable, like Chandler, plea bargain for life and avoid the death
penalty. When the government has a weak case, it usually proceeds to trial. Those who believe they
have a good chance at acquittal will most likely reject any plea offer tendered by the government.
Id.; see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
171. Section 848 contains an aiding and abetting section and subjects to death anyone who
"counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes" the intentional killing. Accomplice liability is
stated generally in the federal aiding and abetting statute which reads as follows:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, com-
mands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done, which if directly performed by him or
another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.
18 U.S.C. § 2.
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actor than an uneducated habitual drunkard who actually pulled the
trigger. 172
Several other cases have concluded where the Attorney General au-
thorized the United States Attorney to seek a death sentence. The theo-
ries of prosecution included the killing of a rival drug dealer,1 73 the
murder of law enforcement personnel, 174 and a case where the victim was
involved in the drug trade as a competitor of the defendant.' 75 Three
other cases are under indictment.' 76
In the Pitera case in the Eastern District of New York, 77 the de-
fense counsel acknowledged a lack of capital litigation experience and
requested the appointment of co-counsel with death penalty experi-
ence. 178 The judge recognized that this was a case of first impression in
172. Government Response to Motion to Strike and Dismiss Counts Two and Three of the In-
dictment at 2, 4, Chandler (No. 90-H-266-E).
173. United States v. Pitera, No. 90-424 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). In the Eastern District of New York,
Thomas Pitera was convicted on June 25, 1992 for the intentional killing of nine criminal associates.
Two of these murders occurred after the amendment of 848 and all involve the Bonnano organized
crime family. The murders involve, with one exception, the deaths of drug competitors or criminal
associates who were believed to be police informants.
The jury declined to impose the death sentence. The defendant will be sentenced to life without
parole on September 18, 1992. The court had a difficult time locating defense counsel with experi-
ence in capital cases since there is no death penalty statute in the state of New York. See Part III,
section E supra. Ultimately, the court assigned counsel from New Jersey, where there is a local
death penalty statute, to assume the defense. Transcript of Motion, United States v. Pitera, March
15, 1991, E.D.N.Y. at 7-8.
174. The government has sought the death penalty where a local constable was killed. United
States v. Villarreal, No. 91-4607, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 12917 (5th Cir. June 8, 1992). In the
Eastern District of Texas, the United States Attorney charged Baldemar Villarreal, Reynaldo Villar-
real and Jesus Zambrano with murdering a local constable who stopped their vehicle during a rou-
tine traffic stop. According to the indictment, the defendants wanted to prevent the discovery of
marijuana in the trunk of the car.
In this case the government did not allege that the defendants were part of a CCE. The one
count indictment traced the statutory language by alleging that the killing took place:
during the commission of, in furtherance of, and while attempting to avoid prosecution and
service of a prison sentence for a felony violation; to wit: violation of Title 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a) Distribution and possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance (Ma-
rijuana) ...
The government did not allege a substantive violation of the underlying drug felony. The gov-
ernment focused only on the murder victim's status as a law enforcement officer.
After conviction, the jury declined to recommend death for any of the defendants, and on July
11, 1991, the judge sentenced one defendant to life imprisonment without parole and another defend-
ant to 40 years imprisonment without parole.
175. United States v. Pretlow, 779 F. Supp. 758 (D.N.J. 1991). In the District of New Jersey the
government indicted Bilal Pretlow for the murders of a criminal associate and a cooperating witness.
According to the charges, Pretlow committed both murders in an attempt to maintain his cocaine
importation and distribution enterprise. Pretlow committed suicide during the trial. Joseph S. Sulli-
van, Union County Jailed Inmate is Found Hanged in Shower, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 31, 1991, at BS.
176. United States v. Mathis, No. 91-301-CR-T-17 (M.D.Fla. 1992); United States v. Tipton,
No. 3:CR92-68 (E.D.Va. 1992);United States v. Williams, No. 1:92-CR-142 (N.D.Ga. 1992).
177. See supra note 173.
178. Transcript of Motion Before Judge Raggi, March 15, 1991, United States v. Pitera (No. 90-
424).
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the district and indicated that she "would like to try to find someone who
has done [the trial or the appellate part of a capital case, not] attorneys
who have never had this experience ... [specifically] someone who has
some experience in capital cases." 179 The defense attorney admitted his
lack of knowledge about the death penalty, and specifically asked the
court to appoint a death penalty specialist to aid with the unique issues
germane to such cases. 180
After hearing from attorneys present at the proceeding who noted
that there is an "entire generation of [New York] lawyers who have
grown up without capital punishment," 181 the court decided to compile a
list of potential candidates with "experience in trial practice, Federal trial
practice and capital cases." 18 2 Those present at the hearing agreed that it
would be a difficult task to find someone meeting those criteria from the
ranks of the New York bar. The court finally stated that it was not nec-
essary that the candidate for appointment be a member of the New York
bar.' 83 This scenario points out the very real difficulties courts may con-
front in states where there is no local death penalty.
These cases and hypotheticals demonstrate the breath of the statute.
As suggested earlier, the statute brings within its scope low-level individ-
uals who have no connection to drugs but who nevertheless assist the
kingpin in the CCE, law enforcement killings related to any federal drug
felonies, and the intentional killings of rival drug dealers. The language
of the statute readily supports each prosecution, and others, that may
result from an even more expansive reading of the law.
VI. CONCLUSION
Judicial analysis of this law awaits the case-by-case examination of
many of the issues raised in this Article as well as other questions not
addressed. Prosecutorial theories will be particularly significant because,
to the extent that the law allows an expansive reading and scope, the
government has a powerful tool to rightfully and aggressively prosecute
the most serious cases.
Provisions of the law that may be constitutional may nevertheless
stand on the outer limits of the permissible punishment. Reasonable in-
terpretations of the statutory language could allow for results perhaps
not intended by the legislators. With an admirable purpose, that of com-
179. Id. at 7-8.
180. Id. at 10, 15.
181. Id. at 22.
182. Id. at 20.
183. Id. at 25.
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batting this nation's hideous drug trade, Congress set out to reach the
targeted group: drug kingpins, major dealers and importers. However,
the law sweeps broadly and catches within its net those not connected to
a drug kingpin's network and those who are not major players in the
drug trade.
Assessment of this law will ultimately be determined by the propor-
tionality of the death sentences to the culpability of individuals "working
in furtherance of" the CCE. The critical inquiry will be whether the
death sentences imposed comport with notions of common sense, judicial
fairness and equal protection of the laws.
A practical effect of this legislation is that the appointment of com-
petent counsel will be an issue, particularly in those jurisdictions that
have no state death penalty law. Of particular concern to the Seventh
Circuit is the lack of a state death penalty in Wisconsin. Expert practi-
tioners with exemplary criminal litigation experience may not be well
versed in the professional pitfalls of capital litigation. Because of the
unique and complex procedures involved, the appointment of counsel
should ignore state boundaries in favor of real capital experience. The
courts should consider a prerequisite to appointment that the attorney
have a minimal level of state felony experience with capital cases prior to
representing a defendant under section 848.
The broadening of the federal death penalty will undoubtedly in-
crease the clutter in an already overburdened federal court. Death pen-
alty litigation translates into longer and more detailed pre-trial
investigation, jury selection, trials and post-conviction appeals and
habeas corpus proceedings. The U.S. Attorney in Chicago, after failing
to secure a death sentence against Alexander Cooper, called for an
amendment to this law to make it easier to secure death sentences.' 84
Such politically expedient solutions are simplistic in approach and do not
take into account the devastating impact such amendments would have
on the federal courts. Serious consideration should be given to the sup-
portive resource centers established in some states to assist in the fair
representation of capital cases. Avoidance of this critical need will un-
doubtedly exacerbate the avalanche of ineffectiveness of counsel claims
that presently clogs the system.
184. Fred Foreman, the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, drew upon
his background as a state prosecutor to recommend that the federal law be changed to parallel the
Illinois death penalty statute. In Illinois the jury is allowed to consider non-statutory aggravating
factors while under the federal law the jury is limited to considering only statutory aggravating
factors. Moreover, a federal jury is told that they do not have to recommend the death penalty.
Foreman Wants U.S. Death Penalty Charges, CHICAGO DAILY L. BULL., March 18, 1991, p. 1.
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Only time will bear out whether the issues raised will impact prose-
cutions brought under this statute. It must be kept in mind that the
legislative purpose is to address the major drug-related killings commit-
ted by kingpins, dealers and importers. Minor players, those working
within the CCE who kill, are no different from any other intentional
felons. Any Congressional amendment to this law should address these
concerns.

